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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*

Though the events preceding and accompanying World War
II have, in their wake, left the death of millions, only one group was
singled out for extermination by the Nazis and their supporters the Jews. This program of genocide was predicated upon only one
criterion -

race.

Except for the slaughter of the Armenians by the Turks in
1915, there has never been another episode when one group of people has been singled out by another group for systematic destruction simply because they were members of a different racial, ethnic,
or religious community.I Certainly, there have been other acts of
genocide in the history of humankind, but never on the exclusive
basis of the victim's racial status. These other events, including
those in recent times which resulted in the killing of millions of
Biafrans, Bengalis, and Cambodians were committed in the course
of a political struggle and ended with the resolution of the political
conflict.
The term "Holocaust" has become an intricate part of modem
Jewish history and culture. That dark period of history has been
insufficiently reported in recent times and its lessons tend to fade
into the history of the Jews instead of being made an indelible part
of humankind's record. This article is a study of those international law aspects relevant to the holocaust.

A.

I. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE LAW OF WAR
An Introduction to the Originsand Development of the
Regulation of Armed Conflict andIts Enforcement2

The humanization of armed conflicts has been the object of
* Professor of Law, DePaul University, Chicago; Secretary-General, International Association of Penal Law, Paris; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences, Siracusa, Italy.
This article was written as part of a National Project on the Holocaust conducted by
Spertus College of Judaica in Chicago under grants from the National Endowment for the
Humanities and the Hyman and Susan Wein Foundation of Chicago.
1. Some have claimed that genocide was committed by the United States against the
American Indian in the Nineteenth Century and against the Vietnamese in the Twentieth
Century. See Appendices A & B infra for a brief discussion of these claims.
2. This introduction is based on an article by the author entitled An Appraisalof the
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regulation by every civilization for centuries. In the Fourth Cen3
tury B.C., a Chinese writer, in a book entitled The Art of War,
described the prevailing customs of sparing the wounded and the
elderly. About that same period, in the Hindu civilization, a body
of rules regulating war on land was embodied in the Book of
Manu.4 In the Second Millennium B.C., the Egyptians had treaties
with other peoples, such as the Summerians, regulating the conduct
of war and the manner in which it was to be initiated. The Ancient
Greeks had rules on sanctuary, the treatment of the wounded, and
the treatment of prisoners.
The Ancient Greeks had developed an elaborate code based
on "universal law" designed to contain the suffering and destruction of warfare. Ironically, it was the barbarian King Xerxes who,
upon learning that the Greeks had murdered some of his envoys,
refused suggestions of retaliation on the ground that the Greeks
had violated the law of all mankind, and that he would not do the
very thing of which he accused them.6
Other diverse and ancient societies have also sought to regulate the use of force in armed conflict. In addition to the examples
mentioned above, research has shown the existence of limitations
on the use of force by the Mayas since approximately the Sixth
Century A.D., by the Japanese since the Tenth Century, and by the
Incas since the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. In medieval Europe, the codes of chivalry and the law of arms restricted violence
to the class of knights and prohibited the use of such weapons as
the crossbow, the arbalist, the Harquebus, and poison.7
The Muslim practices in war - since 623 A.D. - were carefully regulated in terms of the initiation and conduct of war and
were recorded in Saybani's teachings in the Eighth Century.8 In
the Middle Ages, in several landmark Councils, the Catholic
Growth and Developing Trends ofInternational Criminal Law, 46 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE
DROIT PENAL 1 (1975).
3. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (L. Giles trans. 1944).
4. 7 COMMENTARIES: THE LAWS OF MANU (G. Bdhler trans. 1967).
5. See A. AYMARD & J. AUBOYER, I L'ORIENT ET LA GRE'CE ANTIQUE 293-99 (1953);
P. ROUSSEL, P. CLOCHE & R. GROUSSET, LA GRECE ET L'ORIENT DES GUERRES MEDIQUES A LA CONQUETE ROMAINE (2d ed. 1938); C. FITZGERALD, PEACE AND WAR IN ANTIQUITY (1931). For an account of the Roman Armies and reference to Greece, see M. GRANT,
THE ARMY OF THE CAESARS (1974).
6. C. FENWICK, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (4th ed. 1965).
7. H. MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-40 (2d ed. 1894); FENWICK, SUpra note 6, at
667.
8. For cases and practices in international law and relations taught by AI-Shaybani in
the Eighth Century, published in Haiderbad in 1335-1336 A.D., see A1-Shaybani, Siyyar-,41-
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Church set forth certain prescriptions regulating the conduct of
war.9 These Councils were essentially concerned with the Crusades, but they also regulated the initiation and conduct of war.
Subsequent canonic writers developed the Christian philosophy of
the "just war,"' 0 including St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274),'' Vit14
3
toria (1483-1546), 12 Suarez (1548-1584)," Alaya (1548-1617),
Gentili (1552-1608),15 and Grotius (1583-1648), 16 who collectively
set forth a complete doctrinal basis for war and peace and the regulation of armed conflicts. Since the Sixteenth Century, numerous
writings on the regulation of armed conflicts have advanced the humanitarian philosophy expressed by these earlier positions.
The regulations noted above also extended to the practice of
reprisal which historically has been limited to making the enemy
desist from illegal practices of warfare by demonstrating a willingness and ability to do the same. Reprisals were not resorted to
lightly. For example, a Thirteenth Century English practice required ten conditions precedent for reprisals, one of which was a
demand for satisfaction made and refused. Only after the ten conditions were satisfied would the Crown grant letters of reprisal, and
even then the authorization was limited and defined.' 7
The promulgation of general orders embodying certain rules
of warfare is exemplified in early Swedish regulations. In 1621,
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden promulgated his Articles ofMilitary
Laws To Be Observed in the Wars, providing in the general article,
Shaybani, in M. KHADDURI, ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS (1966); see also M. KHADDURI,
WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM (1955).

9. These Councils were: (1) the First Lateran Council of 1122; (2) the Second Lateran
Council of 1139 (which particularly forbade the use of the crossbow); (3) the Third Lateran
Council of 1215; (4) the First Council of Lyon of 1245; and (5) the Second Council of Lyon
of 1274.
10. See, e.g., FITZGERALD, supra note 5; M. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE
AGES (1965).
11. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1260), in which the author relied on the Greek classics

such as Homer, Plato, Aristotle, the Roman Cicero, and Saint Augustine.
12. F. Vittoria, De Indis et de lyre Be/li Reflectiones, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (J. Scott ed. 1917).
13. F. SUAREZ, On War, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS, in II CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 797-865 (J. Scott ed. 1944).
14. B. AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF WAR, in I1CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW (J. Bate trans. 1912).
15.

A. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRE TRES, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (J.

Scott ed. 1933).
16.

H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE,

in

CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(J. Scott ed. 1925).
17. Clark, The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J.

INT'L L. 694 (1933).
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inter alia, that "no Colonel or Captain shall command his soldiers
to do any unlawful thing; which one so does, shall be punished
according to the discretion of the Judges."' Another example is
19
found in the United States where the First Articles of War,
promulgated in 1775, contained explicit provisions for the punishment of officers who failed to keep "good order" among the
troops. 20 These provisions were retained and strengthened in the
Articles of War of 180621 and served as the basis for prosecuting
conduct "against the law of nations. "22 The most noteworthy regulation in the United States is the Leiber Code of 1863,23 which became a model for many countries.
The above sketch provides some random examples drawn
from a variety of cultures over a span of many centuries. They all
indicate the gradual development of a worldwide consensus concerning the humanization of war and the attempt to regulate armed
conflicts. The "modem law of war" 24 is the product of warring experiences - whose beginnings can be traced to the Napoleonic
Wars - which brought about enormous suffering and devastation.
The slow awakening of a humane consciousness throughout the
world community resulted in the formulation of numerous treaties
on the humanization of war, including the formulation of fortyseven multilateral treaties between 1856 and 1973. These treaties
share the purpose of humanizing armed conflicts and reducing the
level of harm and suffering that such conflicts usually engender.
18. Gross, The Punishment of War Criminals.The Nuremberg Trial(Firs/part),11 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 356 (1955).

19. The First Articles of War were adopted by resolution of June 30, 1775. I JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 90 (Lib. of Cong. ed. 1904-1937). These

were repealed and replaced by Articles of War authorized by resolution of Sept. 20, 1776.
Id. at 435-82.
20. Id. arts. IXX (1775) & IX (1776).
21. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. XX, 2 Stat. 359, art. 32. These provisions were modeled
extensively on the British Articles of War. Sherman, The Civilianization fMilitary Law, 22
ME. L. REV. 3, 6 (1970); G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES (3d rev. ed. 1918). This provision survives in weakened form in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1959).
22. See Henfield's Case, II F. Cas. 1099 (C.C. D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (violation of
principles of neutrality by civilian).
23. Promulgated as Instructions for Officers and Noncommissioned Officers on Outpost
and Patrol Duty and Troops in Campaign by Order of the Secretary of War, in Washington
D.C. (War Dep't Classification No. WI. 12: Ou 8, 1863). For other similar rules in the United
States, see WAR DEP'T, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 132 (Doc. No. 467, Apr. 25, 1914); DEP'T
OF THE ARmY,Dep't of the Army Field Manual 176 (Doc. No. 27-10, July 18, 1956). Seealso
DAVIS, supra note 21, which traces the history of the First Articles of War of 1775.
24. "Modem law of war" is an anachronism since, in modem times, "war" is not lawful
under customary and conventional international law except in the case of self-defense.
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It is noteworthy that in the course of the history of the regulation of armed conflicts, states have always been more willing to
codify rules which should have been applied to the preceding war.
In essence, this is the problem of an evolutionary system of law
which relies on the past to chart its future but which is still reluctant
to restrict the main purpose of war - military victory. This explains in part why there have been so few instances throughout history when states individually or collectively enforced violations of
the law of armed conflicts.
The first prosecution for initiating an unjust war is reported to
have been in Naples in 1268 when Conradin von Hohenstafen was
put to death for that reason. 25 The first reported international prosecution for war crimes was the prosecution of one Peter von
Hagenbach in Breisach, Germany in 1474.26 Peter von Hagenbach
was tried before a tribunal of twenty-eight judges from the allied
states of the Holy Roman Empire. While he was not tried for
crimes committed during the war, this trial is significant in that von
Hagenbach was stripped of his knighthood by an international tribunal which found him guilty of murder, rape, perjury, and other
crimes "against the law of God and man" in the execution of a
military occupation.2 7 In 1689, James II of England, though then
in exile, relieved one Count Rosen of all further military duties, not
for the failure of his mission, but because his siege of Londonderry
28
was outrageous and included the murder of innocent civilians.
Among the landmark cases in history involving the prosecution of war crimes are those which occurred during the American
Revolution - with the trial of Captain Nathan Hale by a British
military court and Major John Andre by a board of officers appointed by George Washington 29 - and in the post-Civil War trial
of Confederate Major Henry Wirz for his role in the death of several thousand Union prisoners in the Andersonville prison. 30 The
25. Bierzanek, War Crimes.- History and Defnition, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 560 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as I BASSIOUNI

& NANDA]. See also Bellot, The Detention of Vapoleon Bonaparte, 39 COMP. L. Q. REV. 170
(1923), on the decision of the Congress of Aix La Chapelle of 1810 on the detention of
Napoleon for waging wars which disturbed the peace of the world.

26. Schwarzenberg, The Breisach War Crime Trial of 1474, The Manchester Guardian,
Sept. 28, 1946, at 4, col. 6; DE BARRANTE, IX-X HISTOIRE DES Ducs DE BOURGOGNE (1937).

27.
28.
29.
30.
Military

Parks, Command Responsibilityfor War Crimes, 61 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1973).
Id.
See Colby, War Crimes, 23 MICH. L. REV. 482 (1925).
See 8 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 657 (J. Lawson ed. 1917). The Proceedings of the
Commission were published in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-815

(1868); see also A. ROACH, THE PRISONER OF WAR AND How TREATED (1865).
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United States also convened war crime tribunals after the SpanishAmerican War and after the occupation of the Philippines. 3
Following World War I, the Treaty of Versailles3 2 established
the punishability of war criminals. The Treaty ordered the prosecution of Kaiser Wilheim II by an international tribunal,3 3 that
Germany surrender to the Allies all Germans accused of war
crimes to be tried by military tribunals, 34 and that the Allies establish national war crimes tribunals. 35 A special body, known as the
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties, was constituted to report on the persons to be prosecuted. The Commission issued its report on February 3, 1920.36 In the report, the Allies submitted to Germany the
names of 896 alleged war criminals. For political reasons, however,
that list shrank to forty-five and, of these, Germany tried only
twelve before the Supreme Court of the Reich convened at Leipzig. 37 This introduction is the historical background against which
World War II prosecutions took place.
31. See Court Martial of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, Manila, P.I., Apr. 1902, S.
Doc. No. 213, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2-17 (1902); Court Martial of Lt. Preston Brown, Manila, P.I., June 1902, S. Doc. No. 213, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1902).
32. Treaty of Peace with Germany, done June 28, 1919, 112 BRIT. & FOR. ST. PAPERS 1,
[1919] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 [hereinafter cited as Versailles Treaty], reprintedin 13 AM. J. INT'L
L. 151 (Supp. 1919) (official documents).
33. Id. art. 227. The Kaiser was never tried because he sought refuge in Holland which
refused to extradite him on the grounds that the crime with which he was charged was a
"political offense," and hence exempt from extradition. See Wright, The Legal Liability of
the Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 120 (1919). On the question of the political offense excep-

tion and international crimes, see M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 425-41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION];
Bassiouni, The IdeologicallyMotivated Offenses and the PoliticalOffense Exception in Extradition - 4 Proposed JuridicalStandardfor an Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217,
241-43 (1969). For an analysis of the criminal provisions of the Versailles Treaty, see H.-H.
JESCHECK, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT

DER STRAATSORGANE NACH VOLKERSTRAFECHT

(1952). It is noteworthy that the 1920 Treaty of S~vres with Turkey, see note 62 infra, and its
successor, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, see id., only had a clause (article 230) to the effect
that Turkey would hand over to the Allies those war criminals which may be requested.
However, none were requested and therefore no prosecutions of Turkish violators occurred.
34. Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, art. 228.
35. Id. art. 229.
36. See, e.g., Garner, Punishmentof Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14
AM. J. INT'L L. 70 (1920).
37. Six of the twelve defendants were acquitted. The two major prosecutions were The
Dover Castle, 2 Ann. Dig. 429 (Reichsgericht 1921) and The Llandovery Castle, 2 Ann. Dig.
436 (Reichsgericht 1921). See also C. MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921).
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B. The Prosecution of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
After World War II
1. The Basis for Prosecution. The precedents described
above clearly indicate that "[tjhe right of the belligerent to punish
as war criminals persons who violate the laws or customs of war is a
well-recognized principle of international law." 38 Thus, the Allied
forces, on November 1, 1943, stated their intention to put this principle into effect, declaring that "atrocities, massacres and cold
blooded mass executions which [were] being perpetrated by the
should be the object of criminal prosecuHitlerite forces . . .
tions and punishment. The United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union, "speaking in the interest of the 32 United
Nations,"4 declared that those responsible for the atrocities would
be returned to the countries where the acts were committed in order
to be tried and punished "according to the laws of [those] liberated
countries and of the Free Governments which [shall] be erected
In the case of major criminals "whose offenses [had] no
therein.'
particular geographical location, ' 42 punishment would be the product of a joint decision of the Allies.43
The decision of the Allies regarding the method of trying the
major criminals was embodied in the London Agreement" of August 8, 1945 and its accompanying Charter. The London Agreement provided that "after consultation with the Control Council for
Germany, '4 5 an international military tribunal for the trial of war
criminals "whose offenses have no particular geographical location"' would be established. The constitution, jurisdiction, and
functions of the international military tribunal were contained in
the accompanying Charter. Together, the London Agreement and
Charter were the constitutive authority for the International Military Tribunal (Tribunal) at Nuremberg. The prosecution of indi38. R. WRIGHT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 29
(1948). See also Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 61 (1944).

39. Moscow Declaration, in 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1944) (official documents).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. London Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter cited as London Agreement], with
accompanying Charter, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter cited as Charter], reprintedin 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (Supp. 1945) (official documents).
45. London Agreement, supra note 44, art. 1.
46.

Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1
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viduals to be charged with certain international crimes was to be
divided between the Tribunal, whose function was to try major accused criminals, and the Allies who, in their respective zones of
occupation, would try other accused criminals.
The law embodied in the Charter was "decisive and binding
upon the Tribunal."47 It provided that "[tihe Tribunal . . .shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes:
(a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against human' '48
ity.
Crimes against peace, a relatively new concept which grew out
of World War I, were viewed as the ultimate international crime. 49
The concept of "crimes against humanity" was a novelty, and what
"crimes against humanity" meant in 1946, as well as how it was
applied in the Nuremberg trials, must be clearly understood if the
impact of Nuremberg on international criminal law is to be accurately evaluated. Crimes against humanity related to a body of
doctrine concerning the protection of human rights applicable at
war and at peace. The problems it posed were many.
2. Development of the Concept of "Crimes Against Humanity." The first application of the concept of "crimes against
humanity" was in the context of war. Thus, a legal basis for it had
to be found in the law of war. That basis was identified as the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land5" (Hague Convention) in which it is stated
that "the inhabitants and the belligerents shall remain under the
protection of and subject to the principles of the law of nations, as
established by the usages prevailing among civilized nations, by the
laws of humanity, and by the demands of public conscience."'I
Thus, the 1907 statement concerning the "laws of humanity"
47.

INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY TRIBUNAL, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

218 (Nov.
1, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946) (published by the Secretariat of the Tribunal, Nuremberg 19471949) [hereinafter cited as INDICTMENT, PROCEEDINGS, or JUDGMENT].
48. Charter, supra note 44, art. 61.
49. "It is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 213.
50. The Second Hague Peace Conference, Fourth Hague Convention Regarding the
Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, done Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as Land Warfare Convention], with Annex, Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of Land Warfare [hereinafter cited as Regulations], reprinted n 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90
(Supp. 1908) (official documents).
51. Land Warfare Convention, supra note 50, preamble (emphasis added).
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG, JUDGMENT,
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was deemed one of the authoritative legal sources of international
law which supported the 1945 claim to prosecute and punish those
who committed crimes against humanity.5 2 But "laws of humanity" were not defined by the Hague Convention, nor did the accompanying Regulations 53 (Hague Regulations) concerning land
warfare refer to any specific violations as crimes against humanity.
Thus, a precedent was needed to give a more substantive definitional content to the contemplated crimes. That was found in the
1915 massacres of Armenians of Turkish citizenship encouraged
and condoned by Turkish authorities. At that time, the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia declared that the mas'5 4
sacres constituted "crimes against humanity and civilization,"
and that all the members of the Turkish government would be held
responsible. This was the first time that crimes against humanity
were given a substantive meaning which placed criminal responsibility on individuals as well as states, whether in time of war or
peace. Nevertheless, these crimes were not within the prohibitions
of the Hague Regulations. Additional support was sought in connection with the First World War efforts to prosecute the German
Empire and its allies as well as individuals from allied countries.
To that end, in January 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference of
Paris (Paris Peace Conference) decided to convene a commission of
fifteen members (Committee of Fifteen) who, among other things,
would find facts relating to violations of the laws and customs of
war committed by the German Empire and its allies.55 The Committee of Fifteen found that breaches of the laws and customs of
war had been committed,56 as well as violations of the laws of humanity, and concluded that "all persons belonging to enemy Countries . . . who have been guilty of offenses against the laws and
customs of war or the laws ofhumanity, are liable to criminal prosecution."57 Thus, the warning issued to the Turkish government
four years earlier by the Triple Entente that those responsible for
the Armenian massacre would be held accountable was acted upon
52. The laws of humanity would represent general principles of law and thus provide
one source of international law. See L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-31 (8th ed.

H. Lauterpacht 1955).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 35.

55. The Committee was also to report on the procedures to be employed for trying those
individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes. Id. at 32.
56. The Committee of Fifteen compiled a list of 32 war crimes. Id.
57. Schwelb, CrimesAgainst Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 180 (1946) (emphasis added).
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by the Committee of Fifteen. 8 These crimes, however, did not fall
within the traditional definition of war crimes.5 9 The 1919 distinction between "war crimes" and crimes against the "laws of humanity," however, was not formally embodied in any of the peace
treaties concluded after the First World War. The reason was that
the two American members of the Committee of Fifteen objected to
the inclusion of a reference to violations of the laws of humanity in
the Versailles Peace Treaty. Their view was that war by its very
nature was inhumane and, therefore, that acts consistent with the
laws of war, although inhumane, were not punishable. Considering
the difficulty in determining a universal standard for humanity, the
United States delegates concluded: "[a] judicial tribunal only deals
with existing law and only administers existing law, leaving to another forum infractions of the moral law and actions contrary to the
laws and principles of humanity. ' 60 The United States position
prevailed and no provision regarding the commission of crimes
against the laws of humanity was contained in the 1919 Versailles
Peace Treaty. 6 ' It should be noted, however, that the Treaty of
Svres between the Allies and Turkey did contain an article which
stated as an offense "the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on . . . August [1,] 1914. ' ' 62 Nevertheless, the Treaty of
Sevres was never ratified. It was replaced, in 1923, by the Treaty of
Lausanne 63 which did not contain a similar provision. On the contrary, the latter Treaty granted amnesty to all persons who committed such offenses during the period 1914-1922.60 Thus, the
commission of offenses by a government against its own nationals,
which was covered by article 6(C) 65 of the 1945 London Charter,
had not, in 1923, become part of conventional or customary international law. Indeed, the laws of humanity mentioned as a source
58. Similar offenses committed by the Germans were also made prosecutable.
59. Thus, in 1945, they gave rise to the need to create a special category of offenses
which the London Charter distinguished from war crimes. See Charter, supra note 44, art.
6(c) and Schwelb, supra note 57, at 181. See also note 69 infra.
60. Schwelb, supra note 57, at 181-82.
61. The only offenders to be prosecuted were those "accused of having committed acts
in violation of the laws and customs of war." Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, art. 228(2).
62. Treaty of Sivres, art. 230, quotedin Schwelb, supra note 57, at 182.
63. Treaty of Lausanne, done July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, 117 BRIT. & FOR. ST. PAPERS 543 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Lausanne], reprintedin 18 AM. J. INT'L L. I (Supp.
1924) (official documents).
64. Id. Declaration of Amnesty, art. I.
65. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
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of international law in the Hague Convention of 1907 did not ripen
into substantive international crimes until 1945.
In 1919, the notion had prevailed that a crime against the
"laws of humanity" was too indeterminate to become a part of international law. However, the World War II horrors that the Nazis
committed against civilian populations in Europe left little question
as to whether the standards of humanity were still too indeterminate or vague in respect of what had been done; yet legally, the
1919 precedent was still valid. In retrospect, the chairman of the
United Nations War Crimes Commission noted the United States
position on that question at Versailles in 1919:
They said there was no fixed and universal standard of humanity . . . . They referred to the place of equity in the AngloAmerican legal system and to John Seldon's definition of equity
as a roguish thing. But, . . . equity has established itself as a
regular branch of [the American] legal system. Equally it might
be said that negligence is too indeterminate to constitute a legal
head of liability, but ... in the Anglo-American law of tort it
has become one of the widest and most comprehensive and most
important categories of liability.
If these elastic standardsare of as wide utility as they have
proved to be there is no reason why the doctrine of crimes against
humanity should not be equally valid and valuable in
and not
[nternationalflaw. That law deals with large concepts
66
with the meticulous distinctionsof/munic~pal [law.

Lord Wright's statement was a correct formulation of the common
law of crimes. It did not, however, conform to United States requirements of specificity of crimes nor to the European requirements embodied in the legal principles nullum crimen sine lege and
nullapoenasine lege.
Indeed the concept of "laws of humanity" and its successor
"crimes against humanity" were unusually vague and could hardly
satisfy the requirements of specificity of a criminal statute. Nevertheless, the acts committed against civilians during World War II
did unequivocally violate the provisions of the Hague Convention
which contained specific provisions 67 prohibiting the conduct in
question. Furthermore, the 1864 and 1929 Red Cross Conventions 68 covered some of the acts later included in the 1945 under66. Wright, War Crimes Under IniernationalLaw, 62 LAW. Q. REV. 40, 48-49 (1946)
(emphasis added).
67. See Land Warfare Convention, supra note 50, arts. 42-56.
68. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and
Wounded of Armies in the Field, done Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377, 55 BRIT. &
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standing of crimes against humanity. It must be emphasized,
however, that these earlier prohibitions of certain acts against civilians were related to the conduct of war but did not apply to peacetime.
Thus, those who framed the London Charter had to extrapolate the notion of crimes against humanity from a larger concept
than had been recognized so far. The definitions of war crimes and
crimes against humanity overlapped in several areas. They were
respectively defined as follows:
b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian populations of or in occupied territory ....
c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.69
Thus, for example, crimes committed against civilian populations
in occupied territories would be war crimes. At the same time,
these offenses also would fall within the definition of crimes against
humanity if the "civilian population of or in occupied territory" is
included within the meaning of the phrase "any civilian population." Similarly, "deportation to slave labour" is a war crime and is
included within the term "enslavement" which is also defined as a
crime against humanity.
As a practical matter, most offenses committed during World
War II could fit either category of crimes against humanity or war
crimes. The significant difference between the two is that war
crimes could be committed, logically enough, only during a war,
while crimes against humanity could be committed outside or during the war. Therefore, the words "before or during the war" implied that international law contained penal sanctions against
individuals applicable not only in time of war but also in time of
peace. This, however, presupposes the "existence of a system of
international law under which individuals are responsible to the
43, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (Supp. 1907) (official documents);
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, done July
27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847, reprinted in 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (Supp. 1933) (official
documents).
69. Charter, supra note 44, art. 6(b) & (c) (emphasis added).
FOR. ST. PAPERS
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community of nations for violations of rules of international criminal law ... ."o This concept of individual responsibility had
been established in 1945 byfew precedents. Nevertheless, by 1946,
the precedent was set, albeit in a very vague way. This new international crime, which relied upon the concept of what meaning the
words "laws of humanity" could be given, "[was] used in a nontechnical sense and certainly not with the intention of indicating a
set of norms different from the laws and customs of war; the violations of which constituted war crimes within the meaning of Article
6(b) of the [London] Charter."'"
3. The InternationalMilitary Tribunal at Nuremberg. The
framers of the London Charter were faced with the problems attendant to the creation of an international tribunal which was to
operate on the basis of rules yet to be agreed to by its creators.
Among these problems were the procedures to be employed in the
proceedings, such as how to profer charges and what rules of evidence to use. The conflict between the various legal systems represented was ultimately resolved in favor of the Anglo-American
adversary system which was used most prevalently. Thus, each defendant was presented with an indictment or statement of the
charges against him, each was entitled to counsel, to present evidence, to testify in his own behalf and, particularly, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. European lawyers and judges who
were unaccustomed to cross-examination techniques found difficulties with it, but cross-examination did not play a critical role in the
trial since the prosecution called only thirty-three witnesses. This
was due to the fact that United States prosecutors - whose influence was significant - took the position that the case against the
defendants should be based primarily upon abundantly available
documentary evidence. Justice Jackson's view was that "the disinterestedness and unquestioned authenticity of documents settle[d]
doubts which always would linger if the same story were told by
witnesses, the best of whom always are open to suspicion of bias,
bad memory, and influence." 7 2 The Tribunal consisted of four
judges, one from each of the four major Allies.73
Twenty-four individuals were named in the indictment as de70. Schwelb, supra note 57, at 179.
71. Id. at 180. For relevant portions of the indictment, see Appendix C infra, p. 278.
72. R. JACKSON, THE NURNBERG CASE viii (1947).
73. The prosecution, as well, consisted of four teams - one from each of the Allied
countries. See Charter, supra note 44, art. 14.
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fendants.7 4 They were charged with ten categories of war crimes in
count three, and with three categories of crimes against humanity
in count four.7 5 The facts alleged by the prosecution as constituting
war crimes were also relied on as constituting crimes against humanity under count four.76 Thus, crimes against humanity became
the more inclusive category of crime. It included those acts committed against civilian populations before the war" as'7 8being "the
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.
The charges brought against the defendants were stated in the
indictment in general language. For example, Goering, according
to the indictment, had "authorized, directed and participated...
in War Crimes. . . and. . . Crimes against Humanity. . . includ74. See Appendix C infra, p. 279. Defendant Ley committed suicide prior to the trial,
and Krupp was found unfit to stand trial, leaving 22 defendants. Bormann was tried in
absteniia on the belief, although unproven, that he was dead.
75. The ten categories of war crimes listed in the indictment were: (I) murder and illtreatment of belligerents' civilian populations; (2) deportation of belligerents' civilian populations for slave labor and for other purposes; (3) murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of
war; (4) killing of hostages; (5) plunder of public and private property; (6) extraction of
collective penalties; (7) wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages not justified by military necessity; (8) conscription of civilian labor; (9) forcing civilians to swear allegiance to a
hostile power; and (10) germanization of occupied territories. I INDICTMENT, supra note 47,
at 43-63.
76. The following definition of crimes against humanity represents the general understanding of the term at the time of the trial:
A crime against humanity is an offense against certain general principles of law
which, in certain circumstances, becomes the concern of the international community, namely, if it has repercussions reaching across international frontiers, or if it
passes in "magnitude or savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modem civilizations."
Schwelb, supra note 57, at 195.
77. These were: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts before and during the war. Those acts committed during the war were essentially the
acts alleged as constituting war crimes under count three. Those acts committed before the
war, for example, the establishment of German concentration camps, which did not fall
within the traditional definition of war crimes, constituted a separate charge in the indictment.
78. Under this second category - persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds
- the indictment charged that "Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933, they were
deprived of liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and illtreated. Their property was confiscated." I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 40. These acts
also came within two additional categories of "crimes against humanity" under count four.
War crimes, which were incorporated in count four as constituting crimes against humanity,
included the charge of
deliberate and systematic genocide, Piz, the extermination of racial and national
groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to
destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial or religious
groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.
Id. at 43-44.
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ing a wide variety of crimes against persons and property."7 9 Such
crimes could fall within any of the ten categories of war crimes or
the three categories of crimes against humanity, such as crimes
against civilian populations committed before the war, and persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds during the war.
That was clear in Goering's case who, for example, had issued a
decree on July 31, 1941 directing Himmler and Heydrich to "bring
about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German
sphere of influence in Europe."" ° Such a direction clearly constituted "ill treatment . . .of civilian populations of or in occupied
territory," a war crime under article 6(b), and at the same time "extermination or persecution on religious grounds," a crime against
humanity under article 6(c) of the London Charter. The confusion
between war crimes and crimes against humanity could also be
seen in the Tribunal's judgment which did not distinguish between
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The assumption was that
they saw no need to do so because crimes against humanity included war crimes committed against civilian populations."' This
was reflected in the case of the sixteen defendants who were
charged with and tried for both the commission of war crimes and
crimes against humanity; each was found guilty of both charges or
innocent of both charges.8 2
79. See note 83 infra.
80. See I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 282.
81. According to article 6(c), crimes against humanity could be committed against "any
civilian populations," and by the terms of article 6(b), war crimes could be committed
against "civilian populations of or in occupied territory." The latter population is included
in the former.
82. See Appendix D infra, p. 289-90. The indictment, in that it charged a conspiracy to
commit all crimes alleged, did not specify which particular acts each defendant was responsible for. Rather, it gave a general description of the war crimes and crimes against humanity
attributable to each defendant. Defendants Goring, Hess, Rosenberg, Seyss-Inquart, Jodi,
and Bormann were all charged with a "wide variety of crimes against persons and property."
I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 68, 70, 71, 77 & 76. Hess was sentenced to life imprisonment, Goering committed suicide before he could be hanged, and Bormann was not apprehended. The rest were hanged. Charged with "a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property" in occupied territories were Ribbentrop, Frick, and Neurath. 1d. at 69, 72 & 76.
Ribbentrop and Frick were hanged and Neurath was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
Kaltenbrunner was charged with "crimes against humanity" involved in the system of concentration camps. Id. at 70. He was subsequently hanged. Frank was charged with "war
crimes" and "crimes against humanity" involved in the administration of occupied territories. Id. at 74. He also was hanged. Sauchel was charged with "forcing inhabitants of occupied territories to work as slave laborers in occupied territories and in Germany." Id. at 73.
He was hanged. Funk was charged with "crimes against persons and property" in connection with the economic exploitation of occupied territories. Id. at 74. He was sentenced to
life imprisonment. Streicher was charged with "incitement of the persecution of the Jews."
Id. at 77. He also was hanged. Keitel was charged with "ill-treatment of prisoners of war
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Since the facts supporting the charges were unquestionable,
the issues raised by the defendants at trial were essentially questions of law, the threshold question, of course, being that of the
Tribunal's legitimacy.
The provisions of the London Charter were for the most part
quite clear;8 3 the issue soon became whether its provisions could, in
conformity with existing international law, be applied at all. Obviously, a nation that surrenders unconditionally as Germany had
done is in no position to resist whatever action the victorious forces
deem appropriate. But it was the view of the Tribunal that the
London Charter did not represent "an arbitrary exercise of power
on the part of the victorious nations 84 but was the expression of
international law existing at the time of its creation." 8 5 The United
States was particularly eager to set the example of a valid precedent
which could not be labelled "victor's vengeance." In this respect,
the defendants and their lawyers were helpful in that they forced
the Tribunal and the prosecutors constantly to seek justifications
for their actions and hence to articulate the past, present, and future
of international law. It is this reasoned elaboration which is the
contribution of Nuremberg to the law of nations and "the record on
which history [must] judge [the victors]." 86
4. Some LegalIssues Concerningthe Nuremberg Tribunaland
and of civilian populations of occupied territories." Id. He was also hanged. Charged with
war crimes on the high seas (not a crime against humanity) were Raeder and Donitz. Id. at
76, 79. They were sentenced to imprisonment for life and 10 years respectively. Charged
with anti-Jewish measures and ruthless exploitation of occupied territories were Schirach
and Fritzsche. Id. Schirach received a 20 year term, whereas Fritzche was acquitted. Speer
was charged with exploitation of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive
war. Id. at 73. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Papen and Schact were not
charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity; both were acquitted under counts one
and two.
The defendants' guilt was, generally, established by participation in joint decisions to
commit, and issuance of orders to commit, war crimes and crimes against humanity. For
example, "by a decree of 31 July 1941, [Goring] directed Himmler and Heydrich to 'bring
about a complete solution of the Jewish question' in the German sphere of influence in Europe." I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 282. Ribbentrop, meanwhile, had participated in a
conference concerning the deportation of Jews from Hungary, at which time he said that
"Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps." Id. at 287. See also E.
DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966).

83. Article 6 of the Charter included as an offense, conspiracy "to commit any of the
foregoing crimes." The Tribunal limited conspiracy only to crimes against peace, see I
JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 226, and gave it a meaning much narrower than the prosecutors
had sought. Id. at 225.
84. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 218.
85. Id.
86. JACKSON, supra note 72, at 33-34.
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the Charges. Article 6 of the London Charter makes it clear that
individuals are responsible for acts defined as criminal therein.
Therefore, the view that international law is applicable only to
states who are bound to perform it according to the obligations to
which they have explicitly agreed 87 was implicitly rejected by the
framers of the Charter. Subsequently, the Tribunal also rejected
the contention that the Hague Regulations could not be applied because various belligerents were not a party to them.8 8 The Hague
Regulations, said the Tribunal, were a recognition of the laws and
customs of war then existing (in 1907), which by 1939 "were recognized by all civilized states."8 9 By affirming these laws and customs, the principal source of international law - namely, treaties
- was circumvented in respect of their applicability to their signatories. Both the Charter and the Tribunal construed the law of
treaties so broadly that such an interpretation was open to serious
criticism. International law, however, is not merely the product of
agreement between or among states. It is also the product of custom. This is evidenced by the practice of states, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and the doctrines
developed by the most recognized legal scholars. At Nuremberg
the issue was not whether some international legal sources had
reached a certain level of development, but whether these sources
had enough specific definitional content to derive from them the
existence of a binding legal duty the violation of which would constitute a punishable offense. Furthermore, there was the question
of whether these legal proscriptions met the tests of specificity embodied in the maxims nullapoena sine lege and nullum crimen sine
lege, and the prohibition against expostfacto crimes. Indeed, it is
a principle generally recognized in criminal law that crimes must be
clearly defined and that sanctions must be specified before one can
be held responsible for committing a proscribed act.9" Some of the
acts with which the defendants were charged in counts three and
four were clearly in violation of the municipal law in effect where
these acts were committed,9 1 but they were not violative of interna87. See Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 405
(1948).
88. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 253.
89. Id. at 254.
90. M. C. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 30-32, 50-58 (1978). See also discussion on the Eichmann trial, infra notes 210-227 and Appendix F infra, p. 292.
91. This would apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity which were alleged in
the indictment to be in violation of "internal penal laws." See I INDICTMENT, supra note 47,
at 43, 65. It would not apply to planning or waging a war of aggression which was stated in
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tional law, at least not without substantial extrapolation. Furthermore, other acts held to be criminal were not criminal under
municipal law at that time. Both types of acts, however, were made
applicable in international law and punishable under it.
The view that the Charter represented the retroactive application of law can be illustrated by the charges contained in counts one
and two of the indictment, that is, the charge of planning and waging a war of aggression. The defendants were charged with violating various treaties entered into by Germany which required, for
example, the pacific settlement of disputes, non-aggression, respect
of neutrality, and so forth.9 2 Chief among these was the KelloggBriand Pact93 (Pact of Paris) which "condemn[ed] recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies,"9 4 and "renounce[d]
. . .war as an instrument of national policy.

. . ."'

There is no

question that the parties to the Pact of Paris declaredandagreednot
to resort to war, but did this contract create criminal liability for
those who broke the Pact?9 6 In other words, did the perpetrators of
aggressive war commit merely an unlawful act or a criminal act as
well?
The Pact of Paris contained no sanctions and designated no
tribunal to try its violators. Therefore, according to general principles of criminal law, it did not establish aggression as an international crime. The Tribunal noted, however, that "international law
is not the product of an international legislature, and that such
agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general principles
of law and not with administrative matters of procedure."9 7 The
the indictment to be "in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances." Id. at
29.
92. See I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 84-92; see also Appendix C infra, p. 279.
93. Kellogg-Briand Pact, done Aug. 27, 1928,46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57
[hereinafter cited as Kellogg-Briand Pact], reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 171 (Supp. 1928)
(official documents).
94. I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 89.

95. Id.
96. The Tribunal explicitly rejected the notion that the only subjects of international
law are states and that those individuals who broke the peace were not publishable.
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as
upon States has long been recognized . . . . Crimes against international law are

committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.
I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223. It was nonetheless argued by critics of the judgment that
the contractual obligation created by the Kellogg-Briand Pact in no way established that
violators of the Pact would be subject to criminal penalties. See Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial

Against the Major War Criminalsand International Law, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 223, 237-38
(1949).
97. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 221.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979

19

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 1
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

judges found that "the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument
of national policy necessarily involve[d] the proposition that such a
war [was] illegal in international law, and that those who plan[ned]
and wage[d] such a war . . .committ[ed] a crime in so doing."98
Thus, the failure to specify an act as criminal in an international
treaty was not deemed fatal to the recognition of certain acts as
being internationally criminal. The judges in that context stated:
"Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and define
for more accurate reference the principles of law already existing." 99 As support for its interpretation of the Pact of Paris, the
Tribunal also cited various resolutions and unratified treaties which
referred to wars of aggression as an international crime."°° Critics
of this evidence indicate that such resolutions by international bodies and unratified treaties have no binding legal effect. 0 ' The conffict between the views of the Tribunal and those of its critics
regarding the issue of ex post facto application of the law stems
from differing views as to the sources and functions of international
law. If the source of international law relied upon is a treaty, then
that which has not been agreed upon by the parties does not bind
them. Similarly, if acquiescence in a general custom is not evidenced by consistent practice, then that particular custom is not
part of international law. Basically, this is the positivistic perspective employed by critics of the Nuremberg trial. On the other hand,
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,"'1 2
which are a source of international law, may be binding upon states
even in the absence of explicit agreement or specific definitional
content. Furthermore, if it is accepted that international law "is not
static, but by continual adaptation . . . follows the needs of a
changing world,"'0 3 then Justice Jackson was correct when he said:
"[E]very custom has its origin in some single act. . . .Unless we
are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for international
law, we cannot deny that our own day has the right to institute
customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become
98. Id. at 220.
99. Id. at 221.
100. See, e.g., the Geneva Protocol of 1924, Resolution of the Fifth Assembly of the
League of Nations, LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUB. A. 135 (Apr. 1925). See I JUDGMENT, supra
note 47, at 221-22.
101. See Ehard, supra note 96.
102. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(I)(c), [19701 U.N.Y.B.
1013.
103. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 221.
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sources of newer and strengthened international law.'
The argument that the prosecutors were engaging in retroactive application of the law by prosecuting the defendants for planning and waging an aggressive war was not persuasive when
applied to the charge of war crimes. The crimes defined in article 6
(b) of the Charter, in the view of the Tribunal, were "covered by
articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907 . . .
[and] that violations of these provisions constituted crimes for
which the guilty individuals were punishable, is too well settled to
admit of argument."° 5 Furthermore, the practice of the victorious
nation punishing, not to mention trying, the vanquished for the
commission of war crimes, has precedent. Thus, establishing a special tribunal to administer punishment in accordance with a legal
process, in the opinion of the Allies' judges, did "what any one of
them might have done singly."'" The absence of specific sanctions
in the Hague Regulations was explained by the absence of an international legislature or a permanent international tribunal with jurisdiction to try international crimes. However, this weakness
should not stifle the opportunity to advance international law and
give it a more specific definitional and enforcement content. The
major innovation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, as far as the charge of war crimes is concerned, was not the
creation of offenses which previously had not existed or lacked definitional or enforcement content, but the fact that the trial was conducted internationally rather than by individual states. °7 The
argument that "crimes against humanity" violated the principles of
ex postfacto, nullum crimen sine lege, and nullapoenasine lege was
technically correct. At that time, this crime had not become a recognized international crime. This is particularly true because the
efforts to include this type of conduct in the post-World War I
peace treaties were unsuccessful. In addition, crimes against humanity were thought of in the context of the law of war and not the
law of peace as that distinction was meaningful at the time. The
notion of the protection of human rights outside the context of war
was not recognized until much after the end of World War II. This
II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 47, at 147.
105. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 253. The prosecution of German war criminals after
the First World War was entrusted to German courts which convicted only a handful of
offenders who were very. tightly punished. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 42-51.
106. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 218.
107. At the time of the trial, 17 nations other than the signatories had adhered to the
London Agreement and Charter.
104.
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explains the ambivalence with which the crime was approached at
Nuremberg when it was sought to be extended beyond its war related context. The opposition to an expanded meaning of that
crime was manifested in the position of the United States and Japan after World War I, who objected to the inclusion of a separate
crime called "crime against the laws of humanity" in the Treaty of
Versailles since there was very little if any recognition of this offense in conventional or customary international law. At that time
it was not even considered to be a part of the general principles of
international law. Prior prosecution of war criminals did not include crimes against the laws of humanity as this term was understood in 1919, nor crimes against humanity as it was called in 1945.
Therefore, the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the London
Charter as a recognized international crime was an innovation in
international law. It was in the words of Justice Jackson the "institut[ion] [of] customs . . . that [would] themselves become
sources of a newer and strengthened international law." 0 8 Nevertheless, the difficulty in sorting out war crimes and crimes against
humanity persisted, and the Nuremberg judgment added more confusion than clarity to that new concept. The court's approach was
that because most acts alleged to be crimes against humanity were
also war crimes, they were clearly violative of the generally accepted laws and customs of war. There is, therefore, little practical
significance to the fact that crimes against humanity were defined
as separate, technical offenses. Nevertheless, these crimes did
cover situations such as the killing of Germans by Germans in German territory. Such acts were not war crimes; they were not related
to the War (World War II) and were wholly within the jurisdiction
of Germany. The indictment defined crimes against humanity as
"[those acts] committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war. . . whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.""° Therefore, the threshold issue posed by the prosecution of such offenses committed in Germany against German nationals before the war began was whether
international law could penetrate the domestic law of a nation. The
language of the Charter clearly implied that international law was
in some respect supreme to municipal law.
The question of the supremacy of international law presents
serious questions affecting national sovereignty and intervention in
108. JACKSON, supra note 72, at 14.
109. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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the internal affairs of nations. "0 Surely there is a certain interpenetration of international and municipal law, but to assume that the
jealously guarded concept of sovereignty has been by-passed is selfdeluding. Nations are still very leery of supranational law and its
effect upon their own municipal systems.
The framers of the Charter and the judges of the Tribunal
were undoubtedly aware of the sensitive nature of inquiring into
the domestic affairs of a nation and the precedent this would establish. This is why the Charter provided that crimes against humanity could only be committed "in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," I that is, crimes
against peace or war crimes. This also explains why there was ambiguity surrounding the separate nature of the crime. The tribunal
always tried to link crimes against humanity to war crimes and to
crimes against peace while at the same time underscoring their separateness. Crimes against humanity can best be described, therefore, as a separate but interdependent crime. The consequences of
that approach meant that many crimes committed by the Nazi regime against German Jews before the war were deemed outside the
purview of the Charter and the Tribunal's jurisdiction. This meant
112
that such crimes went unpunished at Nuremberg.
Indeed, while article 6(c) provided that crimes against humanity could be committed before or during the war - a step beyond
the recommendation of the Committee of Fifteen after World War
I - a connection still had to be established between those crimes
and the plans for aggressive war. That necessary "connection" precluded the punishment of individuals who committed acts deemed
crimes against humanity because they were unrelated to war or to
the initiation of war. The prosecutors attempted to establish the
necessary connection, but the Tribunal was of the opinion that as
"revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not
been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in
connection with (other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal)."' 13
Thus, the proposition implicit in the Charter - that international law is capable of penetrating municipal law outside the context of war - was once more limited by the Tribunal's opinion,
110. See discussion on the Genocide Convention, infra notes 255-277.
111. Charter, supra note 44, art. 6(c).

112. Since Nuremberg, however, the Federal Republic of Germany has vigorously prosecuted Nazis who committed such crimes.
113. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 254.
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which in that respect properly reflected the existing state of international law. The debate concerning the proper relationship between
municipal and international law persisted after the War and continues today.
In addition to the above considerations - whether the defendants were subject to international law and whether the law with
which they were charged with violating was properly applied - a
question also emerged concerning whether these defendants would
benefit from certain defenses, namely: (1) were these acts immune
from prosecution because they were acts of state; and (2) were these
acts, if committed pursuant to orders of superiors, beyond punishment? "14 The Charter answered these questions emphatically in the
negative, as did the Tribunal in its judgment when it stated that
"[i]ndividuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations or obedience imposed by the individual state."' 5
The question of whether the sovereignty of a state could shield
a person acting on behalf of the state was considered in 1919 by the
Committee of Fifteen when the Kaiser's responsibility was at issue.
It was the Committee's opinion that to immunize the person from
prosecution would "involve [establishing] the principle that the
greatest outrages against the laws and customs of war and the laws
of humanity, if proved against him [a sovereign], could in no circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of civilized manhood.""' 6 Thus, in 1919, the Kaiser was
formally charged with responsibility "for a supreme offense against
international morality and the security of treaties.""' 7 The Kaiser
was not deemed to be protected by his status as head of state but
neither was he charged with violating international criminal law.
Consequently, when the Kaiser sought refuge in the Netherlands,
that country refused to extradite him on the grounds that he had
been charged, in their view, with a political offense for which extra114. These questions centered around articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, which stated:
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility.
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government
or of a Superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
115. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223.
116. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 264. The United States and Japanese members dissented.
117. See Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, art. 227(1). And, in 1945, some of the Nazi
leaders were charged with a similar international crime, namely, the "crime against peace."
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dition could be denied." 8 The Nazi leaders, on the other hand,
were charged with having committed offenses which constituted international crimes, and the failure to abide by treaties was not an
offense against the security of treaties but a crime against peace.
The fact that the violation of treaties was an act of state was
deemed a valid defense for the individuals charged with that violation. In this context, Justice Jackson stated:
[The] principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logical one if [i]nternational [liaw is to render real help to the maintenance of peace. An [i]nternational [flaw which operates only
on states can be enforced only by war because
the most practica9
ble method of coercing a state is warfare.'
The Tribunal sealed the fate of the act of state defense by stating that "[h]e who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under international law." 2 ° This conclusion left only one defense to the defendants, namely, that they acted in obedience to superior orders.
Article 8 of the Charter, however, expressly rejected this defense.
The defendants, then, could only argue that they were deprived of a
valid legal defense by an ex postfacto application of the law.
The defense argued that an officer was in no position to determine the legality of or justification for war especially when the definition of "aggression" was in dispute.' 2 1 However, that argument
failed in respect to determining the criminal nature of orders constituting war crimes, or such crimes against humanity as the intentional spreading of typhus disease, 22 forced sterilization, 123 and
mass executions of civilian populations.
While the United States and British military regulations in
force prior to World War II indicated that one obeying superior
orders was not punishable as a criminal, 124 these regulations were
not part of the international law. Indeed, they were somewhat inconsistent with the general principles of American criminal law
which contained precedents for the proposition that obedience to
118.
119.
120.
121.

See

II

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION,

PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 33, at 419-20.

supra note 47, at 150.

I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223.
See Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF 'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-39 (1965); see also Vogler, The Defense of 'Superior Orders' in International Criminal Law, in I BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 25, at 619.
122. See I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 48.
123. See id. at 45-46.
124. See DINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 46-48.
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superior orders was not recognized as a defense.' 25
The Tribunal was of the opinion that article 8 was not an ex
post/acto formulation of a novel principle of law. It was the Tribunal's belief that "[t]he provisions of [article 8 were] in conformity
with the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or
torture in violation of the international law of war has never been
recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality ...
."
The Tribunal relied on the Llandovery Castle Case,12 7 a war crime trial
held in Leipzig after World War I which considered the plea of
"obedience to superior orders." The judgment of the German court
trying the case was that
subordinates ...

are under no obligation to question the order

of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But
no such confidence can be held to exist if such an order is universally known to everybody, including the
accused, to be without
28
any doubt whatever against the law.'
There were various formulations open to the framers of the
Charter 2 9 for the rejection of "obedience to superior orders" as an
absolute defense, such as: personal knowledge, according to which
liability attaches only if a subjective knowledge of illegality is established;' 3 ° and absolute liability, wherein subjective knowledge is
irrelevant. The framers chose the formulation that obedience to superior orders was not an absolute defense but could be considered
only in mitigation of punishment.' 3 ' This position was largely in
conformity with international law even at that time.
Preclusion under article 8 of the "obedience to superior orders" defense led the defense to attempt a distinction between ordinary orders, which would be covered by article 8, and orders of the
Fuihrer, which would not be included within the meaning of that
article. The argument, in essence, was that the Nazi regime was
governed by the tirhrerprinzip,according to which "each Ftihrer
(leader) ha[d] the right to govern, administer or decree, subject to
no control of any kind and at his complete discretion, subject only
125. Id. at 48.
126. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 224.
127. 2 Ann. Dig. 436 (Reichsgericht 1921).
128. Id. at 437. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 15.
129. See DINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 104-19.

130. Id. Dinstein correctly suggests that the manifest illegality doctrine is part of the
personal knowledge formulation. In other words, the manifest illegality of an order creates a
presumption of knowledge on the part of the accused and must be rebutted.
131.

Charter, supra note 44, art. 8; see also Appendix D infra, p. 286.
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to the orders he received from above."' 3 2 The ordinary leaders,
then, were subject to the directions of the highest Fthrer, Hitler,
and there "was no contradicting the Fuhrer'sorders."' 133 Of course,
the inability to disobey orders according to the Nazi law was
deemed irrelevant under international law which imposes duties
"transcending obligations imposed by the State."' 1 34 The
Fthrerprinzoi, in the view of the Tribunal, could not be accorded a
position of recognition among the law of nations.
They are not deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them,
if they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned to
their tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. The relation of leader and follower does not
preclude responsibility here any more than it 135
does in the comparable tyranny of organized domestic crime.
Thus, some of the Nuremberg problems were properly treated
while others were given cursory treatment. The desire was to advance international criminal law, and to punish those whose crimes
proved to be unprecedented in the history of humankind because of
the driving forces behind the Tribunal's judgments. Indeed, Nuremberg was not set up as an international moot court to make decisions concerning theoretical problems. Rather, it was set up to
accomplish a minimum of three things: (1) to express the moral
outrage of the world community; (2) to resort to the rule of law to
prosecute and punish those who had violated the law; and (3) to set
an example and a precedent which might serve as a deterrent for
such violative conduct.
5. The Formulation of the "'NurembergPrincioles." The significance of the Nuremberg precedent is that "[it] establish[ed] . . .
international human duties transcending both national obligations
under municipal law and official orders of domestic authorities
[and] . . . inflict[ed] the highest penalty on the civil rulers and military leaders of a 'criminal' state [which] amounted to a revolution
in the law."' 36 In formulating a theory of state sovereignty, early
writers and philosophers based their conclusions upon observable
facts, 13 7 rather than on "supposedly eternal principles concerning
132. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 176.
133. I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 47, at 484.
134. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223.
135. Id. at 226.
136. P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: II GENOCIDE 147 (1959).
137. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 7-16 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
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the nature of states as such."' 3 8 Similarly, the framers of the
London Charter formulated principles of law which could accommodate the horrendous events which had occurred during the War.
In light of these crimes, international law could not maintain that
its only proper subjects were fictional entities called "states."
Rather, individuals had to be held responsible for violations of international law. To paraphrase Justice Jackson, such crimes are
not committed by abstract legal entitites but rather by individuals
whose actions are claimed to be done under the umbrella of state
legitimacy. Their accountability before the international community thus strips their action of its purported legitimacy and makes
them liable to punishment by national or international action.
Only by means of such a concept of "individual responsibility" can
a credible deterrent be established which hopefully will prevent
similar future occurrences. The frequent human depredations
which have occurred since World War II and which continue to go
unpunished, demonstrate that the concept of individual responsibility unfortunately has not been adequately established as a deterrent. The fact that only the vanquished, and not the victors whose actions in some instances also violated the law of war were judged by a law of universal applicability would inevitably
give rise to charges of "victors' vengenance." Nevertheless, the
London Charter and the Nuremberg trial represent a substantial
step in the growth of international criminal law. They laid the
foundation for subsequent efforts to recognize and protect human
rights in time of war and in time of peace. More specifically, aggressive war expressly became an international crime, and in 1972
the United Nations finally reached a definition of aggression. 139 In
addition, in 1949, four new Geneva Conventions on the regulation
of armed conflicts and the protection of human rights emerged." 4
138. Id. at 8.
139. Bassiouni, A Definition ofAggression in InternationalLaw- The Crime .4gainstPeace,
in I BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 25, at 159-79; see generally 1 & 2 B. FERENCZ, DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974).
140. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Prisoners of
War Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
cited as Protection of Civilians Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No, 3362,75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as Wounded and Sick Con-

vention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.

No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Wounded at Sea Convention].
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However, in the absence of an international forum with jurisdiction
to try such offenses, nations will undoubtedly continue to resort to
political rather than legal solutions to deal with aggression - war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of human
rights. This means that retribution, if it is to occur at all, is likely
only in the case of an unconditional surrender by a party to a conflict and if the victor is willing and able to carry out a scheme of
prosecution and punishment. In light of the fact that at least two
conflicts have taken place since 1945 -

Biafra and Bangladesh

-

which should have, but did not, give rise to international prosecution, the likelihood of a Nuremberg reoccurrence is remote.
In the prosecution of war crimes, Nuremberg was unique in
only one respect, namely, the international character of the Tribunal. However, the inclusion of "crimes against humanity" in both
the Charter and the indictment represented a significant, though
cautious, advance in international criminal law. Although the exact scope of "crimes against humanity" is unclear, it is certain that
it was intended to include offenses committed by a state against
civilians, including its own nationals, during the preparation and
the waging of war. It did not, however, encompass those same acts
during peacetime. Indeed, it was not until the 1948 Genocide Convention 14 1 that this lacunae was covered. The London Charter and
the Nuremberg judgment unquestionably broadened the meaning
of crimes against humanity, even though the latter encompassed
offenses which were, for the most part, already covered by the laws
and customs of war. The Charter and the Nuremberg judgment
also included within the meaning of crimes against humanity acts
not necessarily constituting physical mistreatment. By expressly
stating that crimes against humanity could be committed without
regard to an existing state of war - even with the qualification that
they be committed in the execution of or in connection with war
crimes or crimes against peace - they went beyond the wildest expectations of the World War I Committee of Fifteen. This qualification, however, effectively limited the scope of the offense.
The Tribunal did find that crimes against humanity actually
were committed prior to the War; the judgment against defendant
Neurath is illustrative of this fact. His offenses under counts three
and four were categorized as "Criminal Activity in Czechoslovakia," ' some of which occurred before the War. However, since
141. See note 255 infra.
142. See I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 334.
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the offenses were committed in connection with crimes against
peace, that is, the takeover of Czechoslovakia, they were considered
proper subjects of prosecution under the Charter. 4 3 Thus, it was
not the "nature" of the act that was determinative of its punishablility but rather the "circumstances" under which it was committed, 144 surely an artificial criterion.
The judgment of acquittal of defendant Streicher further illuminates the curious way in which crimes against humanity were
defined. The reasoning supportive of the acquittal was that since
the program of extermination of the Jews was initiated before the
War, and hence already in progress, Streicher committed no crime
connected with the War. Thus, one may ponder why incitement to
commit crimes against humanity, when connected with war, is
shocking to the conscience of humankind; but, when such incitement occurs during the formative years of the policy that engendered such crimes, it is not considered morally shocking.' 45 The
persecution of the Jews in Germany before the War is in no way
less criminal than the execution of that policy of extermination during the War. It is all a part of the same continuum and the instigator of the former is no less responsible than the executor of the
latter, and vice versa.
Nevertheless, article 6(c) of the Charter was limited to offenses
directly related to war. This limitation was recognized by one author shortly after the war, who noted:
The crime against humanity, as defined in the London Charter,
is not ... the cornerstone of a system of international criminal
[I]t is
law equally applicable in times of war and peace ....
a kind of by-product of war, applicable only in time of war
It serves to cover cases not covor in connection with war ....
ered by norms forming part of the traditional laws and customs
of war. "
It should be noted, however, that the prosecution of war
criminals and of persons accused of committing crimes against humanity was not confined to the Nuremberg trial. Many trials were
held in the Allied occupation zones pursuant to the authority of
143. Id. at 302.
144. Id. at 304.
145. Arguably, according to the latest constitutional test of when speech urging violence
falls outside the protection of the first amendment, Rosenberg's "incitement" would be protected speech. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) which holds that mere advocacy of the propriety or necessity for use of force is protected. Only when the speech is
aimed at inciting and is likely to incite the act advocated may the individual be punished.
146. Schwelb, supra note 57, at 206.
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Control Council Order No. 10, the purpose of which was to "establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war
criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with
by the . . . Tribunal .. .. "47 Many defendants in these trials
were convicted and punished.
Crimes against humanity were defined by the Control Council
as "[altrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds,
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country
where perpetrated."' 4 8 The language of article 6(c) of the Charter
limiting crimes against humanity to crimes committed in execution
of or in connection with the war was not included in the Control
Council order. The deletion provides further evidence of the caution with which the framers of the Charter proceeded when examining the internal affairs of a state and applying international law
thereto. It has been observed by a noted scholar that
[t]he difference between the Charter and [Control Council Order] No. 10 probably reflects the difference both in the constitutional nature of the two documents and in the standing of the
tribunals called upon to administer the law. . . . [Tihe International Military Tribunal [was], in addition to being an occupation court for Germany, also - to a certain extent - an
international judicial organ administering international law, and
therefore, its jurisdiction in domestic matters of Germany [was]
cautiously circumscribed. The Allies and German courts, ...
administered primarily local (municipal) law, which, of course,
includes
provisions emanating from the occupation authori149
ties.
After Nuremberg, the United Nations, during its formative
years, dealt with the issues raised by the Nuremberg proceedings
and sought to define the significance of this event. Indeed, the
United Nations Organization, which declares maintaining peace
and security 5 ° and promoting respect for human rights 5 ' among
its purposes, responded to the challenge provided by the London
Charter and the Nuremberg judgment. The challenge was to develop a body of international criminal law that could be applied
147. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 12.
148. Ciiedin Schwelb, supra note 57, at 217.
149. Id. at 218.

150. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1, 11970] U.N.Y.B. 1001.
151. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
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during wartime as well as during peacetime so that the Nuremberg
difficulties could be averted in the future. As a result, the first session of the General Assembly indicated its concern with that question in three resolutions which set forth the framework and the
future direction of the international scheme for the protection of
human rights.
The General Assembly resolved that a committee be established to study "the methods by which the General Assembly
should encourage the progressive development of international law
and its eventual codification."' 52 Taking note of the London
Agreement and Charter, the General Assembly "affirm[ed] the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."' 53 The Committee on the Codification of International Law was directed "to
treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the formulation,
in the context of a general codification of offenses against the peace
and security of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of
the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the judgment of the Tribunal."' 5 4 Finally, the General Assembly unanimously resolved that "genocide is a crime under international law, which the civilized world condemns, and for the
commission of which principles and accomplices . . .are punishable."' 5 5 The expeditious response represented by the resolutions
of December 11, 1946 was not to become, in all cases, characteristic
of the world community's attitudes toward the experiences of
World War II and its aftermath.
The Principles of Nuremberg, formulated by the International
Law Commission (ILC) and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950 are:
PrincipleI
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.
Princple II
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act
which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility
under international law.
152.
153.
154.
155.

G.A. Res. 94(1), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 187 (1946).
G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
Id.
G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 189 (1946).
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PrincipleIII
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a
crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law.
Princple IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
Principle V
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the
right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
Princile VI
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law:
(a) Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned
under (i).
(b) War Crimes:
Violations of the laws and customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave-labor or for any other purpose of
civilian populations of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war of [sic] persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and
other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions
are carried on in execution of or in connection with any
crime against peace or any war crime.
Principle VII
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is
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56
a crime under international law.'
With this formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, the arguments concerning the existence of internationally enforceable proscriptions which were raised at the time would now be obviated in
the future. Three questions, however, were not covered by this formulation; first, the creation of a permanent international criminal
court; second, the elaboration of a permanent international criminal code; and third, the applicability in time of the Nuremberg
Principles.
The United Nations addressed the first question in the same
year it formulated the Nuremberg Principles, and the ILC prepared
a Draft Code for an International Criminal Court. The General
Assembly returned the Draft Code to the ILC for further study, and
in 1953 a detailed Code was formally submitted to the General Assembly for its adoption. However, the Code was tabled on the basis
that the General Assembly was unwilling to set up an international
criminal court before it had elaborated a code of international
crimes which the court could apply.
One conclusion can be drawn from the General Assembly's
mandates; namely, that it implicitly recognized the legal significance of the Nuremberg Principles which it had adopted in 1950 as
nonenforceable proscriptions to serve as a basis in principle for the
formulation of specific proscriptions
to be embodied in a future in157
ternational criminal code.

The second question, the formulation of an international criminal code, was addressed by the ILC which submitted to the General Assembly in 1954 the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace
and Security of Mankind.'5 8 The General Assembly, noting that
the proposed Code included the "crime against peace" which, in its
view, lacked definitional content because the General Assembly
had not yet defined "aggression," tabled the Code until a definition
of "aggression" could be established.' 9 It is now once more before
the General Assembly for consideration in 1980.
The third question, the applicability in time of the Nuremberg
156. See G.A. Res. 488(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 77, U.N. Doc. A/775 (1950).
Report of the ILC, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12), pt. iii, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted
in 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (Supp. 1950) (official documents).
157. This project is now being conducted under the direction of this author to be completed in 1978 and submitted to the United Nations.
158. See note 278 infra.
159. The United Nations definition of aggression emerged in 1972. See I BASSIOUNI &
NANDA, supra note 25, at 159-79; FERENCZ, supra note 139.
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Principles, did not become apparent until the mid- 1960's when the
Federal Republic of Germany's statute of limitations on the crime
of murder was about to expire. The Federal Republic of Germany,
like most countries, has a statute of limitations which bars prosecution of offenses after a specified period of time. The period of time
for murder, the highest offense in Germany's criminal code, is
twenty-five years. This meant that by 1970 any person who had
committed murder prior to 1945 would not be subject to prosecution in Germany. Other countries could prosecute these offenders
on the universality theory of jurisdiction because such crimes are
international crimes, but for practical reasons it would be difficult
to prosecute outside Germany. Furthermore, most countries also
have a similar statute of limitations.
In response to this problem, and prompted by concerned persons and groups - particularly, the International Association of
Penal Law - the United Nations proposed an international convention the object of which was to suspend any statute of limitations for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Convention
on the Nonapplicability of Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes
Against Humanity"6 is perhaps the most tangible result of the Nuremberg Principles. If nothing else its message reveals the world
community's refusal to condone morally these acts only because the
statute of limitations has lapsed without the apprehension and trial
of the perpetrators. Indeed, justice cannot hinge on the ability of
those who evade it.
In retrospect, it can be concluded that the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the General Assembly in 1950 are part of the general principles of international law and, as such, constitute one of
the sources of international law as stated in article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. In addition, these Principles
are the basis for the elaboration of an international criminal code
and the creation of an international criminal court even though
both have yet to become legal realities. Nevertheless, it is assumed
- with the 1972 definition of aggression - that there is no longer a
valid legal impediment to the adoption of a substantive international criminal code and the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.
6. The Impact of World War II "Crimes Against Humanity"
on the Regulation of Armed Conflicts and the Protection of
160. See Appendix E infra, p. 290.
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Civilians.6 ' When the extent of World War II's horrors became
known, it was clear that the War had produced more harm to civilians than to combattants. The ratio of civilian to military casualties
is estimated to be fifty to one. Consequently, it became incumbent
upon the world community to elaborate proscriptions capable of
protecting civilians within the context of war. The Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1929162 were deficient in that regard; however,
the efforts of the International Commission of the Red Cross
culminated in the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,163
which sought to ameliorate this situation. It was actually the experience of World War II which brought about the required detailed
regulation which was lacking in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. It was that insufficiency which made it difficult at Nuremberg to offer a substantive definitional content to crimes against
humanity. The Geneva Conventions have endeavored, therefore,
to be specific in that respect. The Conventions' proscriptions are
clearly responsive to the type of acts committed during World
War II. The Fourth Geneva Convention - the Civilians Convention - deals with the protection of civilians and prohibits inter alia
those acts which were deemed crimes against humanity at Nuremberg. It deals, however, only with war-time situations.
The Civilians Convention contains 159 articles.' 64 It is a statement of fundamental and detailed rights for civilians in time of
war. The Convention attempts to extend to civilians those rights
and protections that have been established for prisoners of war and
the sick and wounded of the armed forces.
As in each of the four Conventions, it is important at the outset
to determine the class of persons protected by the Convention. In
this instance, that class is broad and covers most persons who are in
enemy hands. The Convention applies to the whole population of
countries in conflict, regardless of race, nationality, religion, or po161. This section is drawn from I BASSlOUNI & NANDA, supra note 25, at 392-99.
162. See note 68 supra.
163. See note 140 supra.
164. The Convention is divided into four parts and is completed by three annexes. Parts
I and IV contain those articles which are common to all four Conventions. Part II, comprising articles 13 through 26, deals with the general protection of civilians against certain consequences of war. Part III, which consists of articles 27 through 141, is divided into four
sections. Section I contains the provisions relating to the territories of the parties to the
conflict and to occupied territories. Section II governs aliens in the territory of a party to the
conflict. Section III relates to occupied territories. Section IV contains regulations for the
treatment of internees, whether held in the territory of a party to the conflict or in occupied
territory.
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litical opinion. 165 However, certain exceptions to this broad coverage exist that are important in determining whether a "grave
breach"166 of the Convention has occurred. Grave breaches, as defined by the Convention, can only occur in regard to persons or
property protected by the Convention. 67 All nationals of a party
not bound by the Convention are excluded from its coverage, 68 as
are all nationals of a co-belligerent state as long as the state of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in
the state in whose hands they are. 169 Also excluded from protection
are all persons protected under any one of the other three Conven-

tions. 170
Those provisions concerning the status and treatment of protected persons, specifically article 27, carry on the theme of fundamental principles of the laws of Geneva. They are entitled to
respect for the human person and the inalienable nature of fundamental rights.' 7 ' Honor, family rights, religious convictions and
practices, and their manners and customs are protected against
threats or acts of violence, insult, or public curiosity. 72 Women are
protected against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.' 73 Physical and moral coercion to obtain information
is prohibited, 7 4 as are murder, torture, mutilation, and medical or
75
scientific experiments not necessary for the health of the person.1
Similarly, collective punishments, terrorism, pillage, and reprisals
against protected persons and their property are disallowed. 176 The
Convention clearly states that "[tihe taking of hostages is prohib177
ited."
165. Civilians Convention, supra note 140, art. 13.
166. A grave breach results from the commission of any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: (1) wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (2) causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health; (3) unlawful deportation or transfer; (4) unlawful confinement; (5)
compelling a protected person to serve in the armed forces of a hostile power; (6) wilful
deprivation of the rights of fair and regular trial as proscribed in the Convention; (7) taking
of hostages; and (8) extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity. Id. art. 147.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 4.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. art. 27.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. art. 31.
175. Id. art. 32.
176. Id. art. 33.
177. Id. art. 34.
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Protected persons may not be used to render certain areas immune from military operations. 178 The Convention expressly sets
forth the responsibility of the state as well as its agents for violations of the Treaty irrespective of any individual responsibility
which may be incurred. 179 Additionally, protected persons "shall
have every facility for making application to the protecting powers,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red
may be, as well as to any
Cross . . . of the country where they
' 80
them."'
assist
might
that
organization
The Convention also deals with the status of aliens in the territory of the enemy belligerent. All aliens who are protected persons
must be allowed to leave the territory at the start of the conflict
unless it is "contrary to national interests."1 81 Those who leave are
permitted to take the necessary funds and reasonable quantities of
their effects and personal items,18 2 and these departures must be
carried out in satisfactory conditions as regards safety, hygiene,
sanitation, and food.' 8 3 There is an additional general imposition
under this section of the Convention of a duty on the belligerent to
treat protected persons humanely. 84
Protected persons who have lost their employment as a result
of the war are to find paid employment, and if they are unable to
support themselves because of security controls or regulations, the
controlling power has the obligation to support them.' 85 They may
be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the
cannot be directly related to
state they are in, and such employment
8 6
the conduct of military operations.
If methods of control as indicated in the Convention are
deemed inadequate by the controlling power, the belligerent power
is prohibited from the institution of measures of control more severe than that of assigned residence of internment, 187 the latter being justified only if the security of the detaining power makes it
absolutely necessary. 188 Such internment is to be reviewed by a
178. Id. art. 28.
179. Id. art. 29.
180. Id. art. 30.
181.
182.
183.

Id. art. 35.
Id.
Id.

184. Id. arts. 38 & 39.
185. Id. art. 39.
186.
187.
188.

Id. art. 40.
Id. art. 41.
Id. art. 42.
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court or administrative board and must continue to be reviewed at
least twice a year; information as to internments must be given to
the protecting power unless the interned persons object.' 8 9
The section also provides protection for refugees, who may not
be treated as enemy aliens solely on the basis of dejure nationality
of the enemy state if, in fact, they do not enjoy the protection of any
government.' 90 In addition, transfer of protected persons in the domestic territory of a contracting party to a power which is not a
party to the Convention is prohibited.19' This provision is virtually
identical to article 12 of the Prisoners of War Convention 9 2 concerning the transfer of protected persons.
The provisions relating to the rights and duties of the occupying power, and of the protected persons in occupied territory, 193 are
in some respect the most important provisions of the Civilians Convention, for it is in this area that a majority of the crimes against
humanity occurred. The Hague Regulations established rather
general and limited rules for the protection of inhabitants of occupied territory.194 Two world wars proved their grave inadequacies.
It was against this background that these provisions of the Civilians
Convention were drafted. The general principles of these provisions may briefly be referred to here: (1) the occupation is of a limited and temporary nature; (2) sovereignty is not vested in the
occupant; (3) the prime duty is the establishment of order in the
occupied territory; (4) the existing administration, economy, legal
system, and general life of the occupied community should be subject only to minimum alteration; and (5) this "minimum alteration"
is to be determined by the restrictions and changes properly imposed for the security of the occupant's military and civil administration.
One of the most important provisions of this section is that
which prohibits individual or mass transfers and deportation of
protected persons from an occupied territory to that of the occupant
or to any other power, occupied or not, regardless of their
5 It was this practice of deportation which added years to
motives. 19
the Nazi war effort when Germany's own resources were virtually
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. art. 43.
Id. art. 44.
Id. art. 45.
See note 140 supra.
Id. arts. 47 & 48.
See Regulations, supra note 50, arts. 42-56.
Civilians Convention, supra note 140, art. 49.
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exhausted. This same provision allows the occupant to evacuate
protected persons in the interest of the safety of the population, for
imperative military reasons, or because such areas cannot adequately be supplied.' 96 All such transfers, however, must be humanely conducted and the protecting power must be informed of
them as soon as they have taken place. 197 Conversely, this provision prohibits the detention of protected persons in danger areas
and prevents the occupying power from moving parts of its own
population into the occupied territory. 98
As far as children in occupied territories are concerned, it is
stipulated that the occupying power will facilitate, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, the proper working of all
institutions which concern themselves with the care, maintenance,
and education of children.' 99 Moreover, a special information bureau" is responsible for recording the identification of children
whose identification is in doubt as well as any information relating
to their parents or other near relatives.20"
Compulsory service of protected persons in the armed forces of
the occupant is absolutely prohibited and the class of work that the
inhabitants may be forced to do is limited.2" 2 In particular, they
cannot be forced to undertake any work which would require them
to partake in or contribute to military operations.20 3
The Convention appears to have made a significant advance in
the protection of both public and private property. It is provided
that destruction of such property by the occupying power is prohibited "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations. ' 2°
Judges and public officials are to have their status maintained
even though the occupying power may remove them from their positions.20 5 If, however, they wish to resign for reasons of conscience, they may not be coerced into remaining in office.
The Convention further provides detailed provisions for hospitals, public health, and relief shipments operated under the supervi196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 50.
Id. art. 136.

201.

Id. art. 50.

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. art. 51.
Id.
Id. art. 53.
Id. art. 54.
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sion of the protecting power.2 °6 It is also provided that the
occupying power must insure "to the fullest extent" the sufficiency
of the food and medical supplies of the population.2 °7 When necessary, after the needs of the population have been considered, the
occupying power may import those supplies required when resources are inadequate within the occupied territory. 2 8 This section appears clearly to transform internment from what previously
may have been a punishment into a safety measure for the public
authorities, with safeguards for the individual.20 9
The fact that a convention exists exclusively for the protection
of civilians is noteworthy; it represents a substantial step in humanitarian progress. The machinery available within the four comers
of its provisions can provide some humanization of war. Clearly,
the Convention does not cover peacetime situations which presumably are covered by the law of peace - or, more specifically,
through treaties on the international protection of human rights
and other specialized conventions.
C

Post-Nuremberg Developments in the Prosecution of "Crimes
Against Humanity": The Eichmann Trial

Since Nuremberg, many states have prosecuted war criminals
in national or specially constituted tribunals. No state, however,
had tried major war criminals whether at large or dead. Two notorious criminals, however, were still sought. They were Martin
Bormann and Adolph Eichmann. Bormann was said to be dead;
Eichmann was known to be alive. The search for Eichmann resulted in his trial in Israel. His trial was the only trial of a major
war criminal to be held outside Germany.
Eichmann was discovered in Argentina where he was kidnapped by Israelis and brought back to Israel to stand trial under a
1948 Israeli law for crimes committed against the "Jewish people."
He was charged under international law with crimes
against humanity - as embodied in the Nuremberg Principles and with genocide. Specifically, he was charged with: (1)having
participated in the killing of Jews between 1939 and 1945;211 (2)
206. Id. arts. 56-62.
207. Id. art. 55.
208. Id.
209. Id. arts. 79-135.
210. The law under which Eichmann was tried was passed in 1950 by the Knesset and
titled "The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law."
211. See Eichmann Trial, Verbatim Transcripts, Indictment, count 1.
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"having placed millions of Jews in living conditions . . . which

were calculated to bring about their physical destruction";2

2

(3)

having enslaved, starved, and deported Jews so as to deprive them
2 13 and (4) having committed other
of rights as human beings;
21 4
crimes against humanity.
Eichmann argued that the Israeli court was without competence to try the charged offenses. The court held, however, that it
was competent to try them.2 1 5 Eichmann also argued that the Israeli law - and genocide - with which he was charged were being
applied retroactively. The court found that retroactivity in this case
was just.2 16 In addition, Eichmann advanced the argument that the
improper means by which he was brought before the court deprived it of authority to hear the case. This argument was likewise
rejected.2 17
The court relied on three theories of extraterritorial application of laws to justify its subject-matter jurisdiction in the case. The
212. Id. count II.
213. Id.
214. Id. counts 5, 6 & 7.
215. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 24-25 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
216. The court, in its judgment, recognized that Israeli law was being retroactively applied, see id. at 20, but found that it "ha[d] to give effect to the law of the Knesset, and...
[could] not entertain the contention that the law conflict[ed] with the principles of international law." Id. at 25. In other words, the court was not empowered to review legislative
acts. It should be noted that while most legal systems recognize the principle of exposifacto,
it has been maintained that it is not a rule of international law. Moreover, there are significant examples of its non-application in municipal law. Id. But see Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, infra note 228, art. 11(2): "No one shall be guilty of any penal offense...
which did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed." A similar provision is found in article 15 of the yet to become
effective International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp (No. 21) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Article 15(2) of this Convention provides, however, that "Inlothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any
person for any act. . . which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations." Crimes against humanity, with which Eichmann was charged, were found to be in violation of the law of
nations according to the Nuremberg judgment. If the judgment represents the application of
general principles of international law, the Israeli court was correct in holding that Eichmann's acts were violative of international law when committed.
217. Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 76 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961). The court
found that under Israeli law the kidnapping did not affect its jurisdiction to hear the case,
and that this view was consistent with the municipal law of other nations. American precedent for example, holding that the use of improper means to bring an individual into the
jurisdiction is irrelevant to the competency of its courts to try the case, was especially relied
upon by the court. Id. at 67-73. Bul see INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at
121-201.
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first was the "protected interest theory, ' '2 ' 8 according to which acts
committed outside the territory of a state may properly be brought
before its courts if the acts in question affect significant interests of
the state.2 "9 The second was the "nationality theory" which allows
a state to prosecute a person who has harmed its nationals. 220 Both
of these theories should be questioned, however, since Israel did
not exist as a state at the time Eichmann's acts occurred and, hence,
could have had no national interests in the protection of those who
were not its citizens. Israel relied, however, on the theory that it
embodied the "Jewish people" concept in its political existence, and
that this concept allowed Israel to extend its protective jurisdiction
to all Jews wherever located. This theory has no basis in international law, particularly in respect to the jurisdictional applications
given to it. However, Israel had another valid basis of jurisdiction.
The district court of Jerusalem appropriately held that "the authority and jurisdiction to try crimes under international law are universal. ' 221 This is the doctrine of universality of jurisdiction in
cases of international crimes which are "no longer national, but
hostis humanigenerisand as such. . .[may be prosecuted] by any
218. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 50 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961). See
generally INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION,supra note 33, at 47-50.

219. Closely akin to the protected interest theory is the passive personality theory which
allows a state to apply its law extraterritorially to acts affecting the welfare of its nationals,
wherever they may be located. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 46.
The passive personality theory finds its most celebrated application in the case of the S.S.
Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, no. 10. The Lotus, a French ship, collided with a Turkish vessel
near Turkish territorial waters. Turkey claimed jurisdiction under the Turkish Penal Code
to try the French officer in charge. The Code provided that offenses committed outside Turkey to the prejudice of the Turkish state or her subjects were prosecutable under Turkish
law.
The Court, in dicta, responded to the French contention that Turkey was without jurisdiction to try the offense, stating:
The territoriality of criminal law is not an absolute principle of international law
and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty. . . .Far from laying down
a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the application of their
laws and the jurisdiction of their country to persons, property and acts outside their
country, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is limited
only in certain cases by prohibitive rules.
Id. at 19-20.
The Lotus was not the basis of the Israeli court's upholding jurisdiction in Eichmann,
however. This was so because The Lotus recognized that a person denying a court's jurisdiction has the burden of proving which rule of international law applies, and the Israeli court,
rather than placing the burden on the defendant, preferred to establish positively Israel's
right to punish. P. PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL 135 (1964).
220. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 50 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
221. Id. at 26.
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State anywhere. 2 22
As to the charge of genocide, by 1961 that crime was recognized as an international crime by virtue of the Genocide Convention of 1948. But the crime of genocide for acts committed during
the period 1939-1945 did not exist. Nevertheless, the charges
against Eichmann constituted an international crime in light of the
London Charter and the Nuremberg judgment. Thus, the district
court of Jerusalem was correct in applying the theory of universal
jurisdiction as was the Israeli Supreme Court in upholding the
lower court's decision.22 3 Thus, the application, in Eichmann's
case, of a universality theory of jurisdiction instead of the preferred
theory of territoriality was valid, but the retroactive application of
the crime of genocide contravened the terms of the Convention
even though "the territorial jurisdiction established by [the Genocide Convention] is only determined as an obligatory minimum
which in no way limits the rights of the signatory states to punish. ' 224 In other words, customary law may coexist with conventional obligations of treaties so that the right to punish may be
exercised, notwithstanding the terms of the Genocide Convention,
by any nation "within the framework of international customary
22 5

law."-

While providing an effective theoretical basis for dealing with
offenders, the recognition of universal jurisdiction to try the crime
of genocide also poses certain problems. One such problem is represented by the view that
crimes against humanity for the most part are committed by the
state within the framework of its political activity and directed
against its own citizens; ... to submit these crimes to the jurisdiction of a foreign country would constitute a form of intervention in the affairs of the state ... and would allow one state to
interfere
with policies applied by another state to its own citi2 26
zens.
Thus the dilemma: intervention in the internal affairs of another
state - which is improper but necessary to bring a person to trial
222. Id citing In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 7 Ann. Dig. 213, 215 (Jud. Comm. of the Privy
Council, Gr. Brit., 1934).
223. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Supreme Court of Israel
1961). It is to be noted, however, that if the crime of genocide is prosecuted in the future
pursuant to the Genocide Convention, see note 255 infra, the preferred theory of jurisdiction
is the territorial one whereby jurisdiction vests in the territory in which the crime occurred
unless there is a competent international criminal court.
224. PAPADATOS, supra note 219, at 50.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 47.
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or observance of the rule of nonintervention and thus the denial
of justice by freeing an alleged criminal. Of course, states are obligated to prosecute or extradite - aut dedere aut iudicare - but
what if a state fails to do either? The remedies are limited. As one
author noted:
The repression of genocide can be effectively undertaken only by
means of an international system of criminal justice. International legislation of substantive criminal law is doomed to remain a dead letter precisely in the most serious and dangerous
cases of governmental crime by the persons in power unless an
international criminal court [can] effectively . . . exercise jurisdiction and administer penal sanctions ....
-

II.
A.

THE HOLOCAUST AND THE LAW OF PEACE

The UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights

228

Shortly after its creation in 1946, the United Nations turned its
attention to the protection of human rights. The first order of business of the United Nations and the Human Rights Commission was
to prepare an "international bill of rights. ' 229 The latter was to
"consist of a Declaration of Human Rights, one or more conventions on human rights, and the necessary international measures of
implementation. ' 230 Though the Declaration itself had no binding
legal effect,2 3 1 its legal significance subsequently changed. Since its
adoption, the Declaration has influenced the drafting of constitutions of nations which gained their independence in the 1950's and
2 33
early 1960's.232 In 1971, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
227. DROST, supra note 136, at 201.
228. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Human
Rights Declaration], reprintedin BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 106-12 (I. Brownlie
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BASIC DOCUMENTS]. Various provisions of the Declaration
have been included in conventions, i e., legally effective agreements. For example, equal
protection of the laws is embodied in article 5 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See note 297 infra.
229. The Human Rights Commission was set up under the auspices of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations "for the promotion of human rights." See U.N. CHARTER art. 68. One of the functions of the Economic and Social Council is to "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all." Id. art. 62.
230. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (U.N. PUBL. E. 73.1.13) (1973).
231. See Lauterpacht, Universal DeclarationofHuman Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 354
(1948); Briggs, Implementation of the ProposedInternationalCovenant on Human Rights, 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 389 (1948).
232. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 230.
233. Advisory Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
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indicated that the Declaration may be viewed as binding insofar as
the affirmations contained therein
[h]ave acquired the force of custom through a general practice
accepted as law. . . .One right which must certainly be considered a pre-existing binding customary norm which the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights codified is the right to equality,
which by common consent has ever since the remotest times
been deemed inherent in human nature.2 34
The ICJ opinion also held that the provisions of the Declaration
represent "general principles of international law recognized by
civilized nations," and are legally binding because they interpret
,the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and are
applicable to member states as the embodiment of article 55, the
execution of which is required by article 56. " 235
The Declaration recognizes in its preamble the importance of
protecting human rights - so that another holocaust may be
avoided - and states that "disregard and contempt for human
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind," and that "it is essential, if man is not to be
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the
-"I The basic human rights enumerated in the
rule of law. ....
23 7 freedom from slavery; 23 8
Declaration include: the right to life;
freedom from torture or cruel, inhumane punishment; 239 equal protection of the laws;2' fair trial; 24 ' freedom of assembly; 242 and
those limitations on the power of government that are typically
found in a "bill of rights" or a national constitution.24 3 The Declaration also recognizes nontraditional rights. These rights include,
for example, the right to social security, 24 the right to rest and
234. Id. at 76, discussed in INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 159.
235. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 160. Lauterpacht rejects the view

that the Declaration is binding as an interpretation of principles contained in the United
Nations Charter. See Lauterpacht, supra note 231, at 369. Municipal courts of the United
States have also, generally, rejected the notion that United Nations principles are operative
as self-executing. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 943-47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SOHN & BUERGENTHAL].
236. Human Rights Declaration, supra note 228, preamble.
237. Id. art. 3.
238. Id. art. 4.
239. Id. art. 5.
240. Id. art. 7.
241. Id. arts. 8, 9, 10 & II.
242. Id. art. 20.
243. 1d. arts. 18 & 19.
244. Id. art. 22.
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leisure,2 4 5 the right to an adequate standard of living,2 46 and the
right to participation in the cultural life of the community.24 7
The broad language employed by the drafters of the Declaration, as well as the certainty of encountering multiple interpretations of novel propositions and possible conflicts with municipal
law, 248 are among the reasons that the first efforts of the Human

Rights Commission were directed at a mere "declaration" rather
than a draft convention. The Declaration was adopted without opposition although eight members abstained.2 49 The prospect that
the Declaration would eventually be reduced to convention form
was not universally applauded. For example, influential groups in
the United States were highly critical of many aspects of the Declaration. The President of the American Bar Association typified the
obstacle that differing political perspectives would place in the development of human rights legislation when he criticized articles 22
through 27250 as constituting "an agreement to adopt the 'New
Deal' on an international scale by committing the member nations
to a paternalistic form of government which would attempt to care
for all the daily needs of the citizen, and minimize the incentive for

individual initiative and progress."' 25 1 Fortunately, this was a lim-

ited perspective and did not receive much support. In addition to
constituting in some respects "general principles of law. . . or represent[ing] elementary consideration of humanity, ' 252 the effect of
the Declaration is that "it embodies . . . a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and nations .... ,253 The moral and
legal force of the document is open to argument, but if the pronouncement of Nuremberg is that the community of nations places
245. Id. art. 24.
246. Id. art. 25.
247. Id. art. 27.
248. See Lauterpacht, supra note 231, at 362. The Canadians, for example, believed that
article 21 of the Declaration was inconsistent with Canadian law.
249. The abstaining nations were: Byelorussian SSR; Czechoslovakia; Poland; Saudi
Arabia; Ukranian SSR; USSR; Union of South Africa; and Yugoslavia.
250. Articles 22-27 proclaim the individual's right to: (I) the realization of the economic,
social, and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality; (2) a free choice of employment under just and favorable conditions of work; (3)
rest and leisure, including limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay; (4) a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family; (5) free
education, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages; and (6) participate freely in the
cultural life of the community.
251. Holman, "An InternationalBill of Rights'" Proposals Have DangerousImplications
for U.S., 34 ABA J. 984, 1080 (1948).
252. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at 106.
253. See Lauterpacht, supra note 231, at 366.
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legal as well as moral duties upon individuals, and if the progress of
law is measured by the development of effective limitations on the
arbitrary exercise of power, then the Declaration was a step forward.2 54 It symbolizes a shift from a concern for people exclusively
in the context of war to a broader humanitarian concern applicable
in a universal context and at all times.
B.

of the
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
25 5
Convention)
(Genocide
Genocide
of
Crime

A quarter of a century ago, Lemkin said that new conceptions
254. See id. at 370-75.
255. Openedfor signatureDec. 8, 1948,78 U.N.T.S. 277, [19491 Can. T.S. No. 27 (entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention], reprintedin 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1951) (official documents), and in BAsIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at
116-20.
The United States has consistently refused to ratify the Genocide Convention since its
submission to the Senate in 1949. That year the American Bar Association's special
committee on the Convention opposed its ratification. See Report, Peace and Law Through
United Nations, 74 REP. ABA 316 (1949); Resolution of the A.B.A. Section of International
and Comparative Law, Report and Recommendations (1949); see also Finch, The Genocide
Convention, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 732 (1949) whose editorial on the position of the American
JournalofInternationalLaw supported the A.B.A. conclusions. For a more recent study, see
Comment, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 683
(1975). The arguments advanced at that time have since been reiterated.
The principal objections to the Convention are: (1) the Convention as drafted is
imprecise in its language and vague to its specific prohibitions particularly in respect to
conduct which is anticipatory; (2) the mental element as described is believed to be
sufficiently imprecise for enforcement in United States courts; (3) the Convention prohibits
"incitement" to Genocide which is believed to violate the first amendment to the
Constitution (freedom of speech), see McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the
Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950); Goldberg & Gardner, Time To Act on the Genocide
Convention, 58 ABA J. 141(1972); (4) all state criminal laws include the prohibitions covered
by the Convention; (5) concurrent jurisdiction over the same crimes creates confusion
between the federal and state courts; (6) the Convention's creation of an international
criminal court is unacceptable because United States citizens would not benefit in that type
of a court from the constitutional safeguards otherwise available to them in United States
courts.
Most of these arguments have, however, been discredited. In substance, the United
States' position is intended to prevent any form of foreign intervention in its domestic affairs.
It is nonetheless valid to argue that the 1948 Convention suffers from imprecise drafting.
The vote on the Convention was 55 votes to 0, with Costa Rica, El Salvador, and the
Union of South Africa absent. See 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 755-56 (1948) for a statement
made before the General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1948, by Ernest A. Gross, Legal Advisor,
Department of State and alternate United States Representative to the General Assembly.
On the background of the Genocide Convention in the United Nations, see M.
WHITEMAN, I DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-20 (1963).

See generally Comment,

Genocide. A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Commentary on the Convention]; Kuhn, The Genocide Convention andState Rights, 43 AM. J.
INT'L L. 498 (1949); McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3
VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950).

On May 28, 1951, by a vote of 7 to 5, the International Court of Justice, at the request of
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require new terms. Thus, a new word entered the legal vocabulary
genocide. It was intended
to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups

-

..

.

. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration

of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religions and the economic existence of national
groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health,
dignity, and even lives of the individuals belonging to such
groups.2 56
The standard of mankind's "common morality" increased with
each tragic advent of human atavism. As more people considered
all wars to be fratricide, and human dignity the most sacred value
of civilization, genocide acquired more meaning to more people.2 57
At Nuremberg, the distinction was drawn between the murder
of anti-Nazi Germans and German Jews, and anti-Nazi nonGermans and non-German Jews. The Tribunal concerned itself
with crimes committed in time of war or connected with war, excluding peacetime atrocities. 25 Thus, "crimes against humanity"
were considered to be either "war crimes" or separate crimes "connected to the conduct of war." Nuremberg thus provided a weak
precedent for international individual responsibility with regard to
the General Assembly of November 16, 1950, delivered an advisory opinion on three
questions concerning reservations to the Genocide Convention. Advisory Opinion or
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15.
First, the court declared that a state having made and maintained a reservation which
has been objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention, but not by others, can
be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, the state cannot be regarded as being a
party.
In reply to the General Assembly's second question concerning the effect of the
reservations with respect to parties objecting to or accepting a reservation, the court held that
if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving state
is not a party to the Convention. If, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as
being compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that
the reserving state is a party.
Third, the court stated that an objection made by a signatory state which has not yet
ratified the Convention can have legal effect only upon ratification; until that moment, the
objection merely serves as a notice to the other states of the eventual attitude of the signatory
state. Further, an objection made by a state which is entitled to sign or accede, but which has
not yet done so, is without legal effect.
256. R_ LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).
257. Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 147
(1947).
258. OPPENHEIM, supra note 52, at 279.
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non-war-connected crimes. Yet, the world community realized the
need to legislate the prohibition and punishment of mass destruction of human lives in time of peace, 259 and in 1948 the Genocide
Convention was adopted by the General Assembly.
In 1948, the General Assembly resolved 260 that genocide one category of crimes against humanity - constituted a crime
under international law. Like the resolution adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the genocide resolution was not
positive law. However, unlike the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the genocide resolution was embodied into a Treaty ratified
by a sufficient number of states to come into force. 26 1 Genocide is
defined by the Convention as follows:
[W]ith intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another
262
group.
The Convention provides that "genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law. .... -263 Thus, the Convention, which hopefully will operate
primarily - if not exclusively - in time of peace, took the logical
stride beyond the London Charter and the Nuremberg judgment.
It included, however, within the definition of genocide, "serious
bodily or mental harm to members of a group" in terms equally as
259. This was one of the objectives of the ILC's Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954 which was tabled by the General Assembly.
Johnson, The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security ofaMankind, 4 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 445 (1955). The Draft Code is discussed infra, notes 278-296.
260. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
261. Genocide Convention, supra note 255, art. XIII. The main principles established by
the Convention are: (1)the contracting states are bound to enact the laws needed to give
effect to the provisions of the Convention; specifically, to provide effective penalties; (2)
states undertake to try persons charged with these offenses in their competent national courts;
(3) parties to the Convention agree that the acts listed shall not be considered political
crimes. Therefore, they pledge to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties. Id. arts. V, VI & VII.
262. Genocide Convention, supra note 255, art. II.
263. Id. art. I.
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broad as the terms used to define crimes against humanity at Nuremberg.
In addition to the above, the original drafts of the Convention
referred to cultural genocide as "acts aimed at destruction of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, and religious edifices,

or the suppression of language or printing media of a particular
group. '' 264 While such a notion is not included in the Convention,
which is limited to offenses committed against the person, aspects
of cultural genocide are within the coverage of other conventions.2 65
The key phrase in the definition of genocide is "with intent to
destroy in whole or in part. . . a group as such." Thus, genocide
can only be committed when it is established that the accused ex-

hibited the requisite state of mind. Therefore, an attack upon one
or a few members of a disfavored group, which attack is motivated

by the latter's membership in that group, is not genocide unless an
intent to destroy "in whole or inpart. . .the group as such" can be
established. While it is perfectly possible that one could subjectively intend the partial destruction of a group by such an act, it
seems unlikely that one would be charged with genocide. The apparent ability to commit genocide, while not an element of the offense, would apparently determine whether a charge of genocide
would lie. This points up a basic weakness in the Convention.
Jurisdiction under the Convention to try the offense of genocide is proper "in the territory of which the act was committed, or
by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
... 266 The Convention, therefore, adopts the territorial principle of jurisdiction. In this regard, it must be remembered that the
trial of the German major war criminals was held by an international tribunal and not by a municipal tribunal of the territory in
which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. In other words, the London Charter was not based upon the
territorial theory, but rather upon the universality theory, of juris264. Commentary on the Convention, supra note 255, at 1145.
The Nuremberg indictment listed as a war crime "plunder of public and private property." I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 55. Included in article 55 was the destruction of
cultural monuments and scientific institutions. The Hague Regulations also proscribed the
destruction of institutions devoted to religious worship, arts and sciences, or historical monuments. See Regulations, supra note 50, art. 56.
265. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, infra note 297, art. 5(d) vii-ix.
266. Id. art. VI.
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diction.2 6 7 As noted above, the universality theory provides that
certain acts constitute offenses against the world community and, as
such, any tribunal is competent to try them. Thus, a curious paradox: crimes against humanity, as defined by the London Charter,
were tried under a universality theory of jurisdiction; yet, under the
Genocide Convention, the universality theory was relegated to an
alternative theory.
The Convention provides that enforcement of its provisions is
to be entrusted to the contracting parties. In accordance with their
respective constitutions, the parties "undertake to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Convention
and, inparticular,to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide .. ".."268
The principles of penal responsibility in the
Convention extend to principals and accessories, before and after
the fact as in the case of any common crime, regardless of whether
such individual is a public official, scientist, writer, or anyone who
instigates, plans, prepares, conspires, contributes, or executes the
crime in whole or in part. This responsibility also extends to "popular spontaneous" acts of masses who may commit such acts as are
prohibited by the Convention. 269 As noted above, it seems unlikely
that any individual is capable of committing genocide; the offense
is only likely to be committed under governmental direction. A
government that is intent upon genocide certainly will not allow its
municipal law to be applied against itself. Thus, although genocide
may be considered an international crime, the government officials
responsible are not subject to effective sanctions. The repression of
genocide, then, can be effective only if, in addition to municipal
legislation, an international criminal court can be established with
effective means of exercising its jurisdiction and implementing its
judgments. In addition, the Convention must be supplemented
with collective sanctions. The "collective" aspect of genocide is to
be seen in the protected groups under the Convention. According
to the definition of the crime, the element of "collectivity" is to be
found in the special intent to destroy a particular human group. It
is argued that, fundamentally, genocide is but mass homicide with
a special interest directed toward a special category of people but
ultimately perpetrated on a particular person belonging to such
267. For a discussion of the various theories of jurisdiction, see Bassiouni, Theories of
Jurisdiction and TheirApplication in ExtraditionLaw and Practice,5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1,
50-57 (1974); BRIERLY, supra note 137, at 299-304.
268. Genocide Convention, supra note 255, art. V.
269. Id arts. III & IV.
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group. The definition of genocide also leads to the conclusion that
genocide amounts to an offense against the fundamental human
rights of the individual.
If there is any dispute between one country and another on the
interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the Convention, the
dispute must be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute, to the International Court of Justice.2 7 °
The Convention declares that those guilty of genocide and the
other acts listed shall be punished "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals."
This clause makes it impossible for a person to plead immunity
because he was the head of a state or held some other public office.27 ' In addition, any contracting party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the related
acts.27 2
The Convention also envisages trial by an international criminal court 27 3 should one ever come into being. During discussion by
the legal Committee in 1948, the question of an international penal
jurisdiction was carefully considered. Thereafter, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 274 which contained three important
provisions. First, the resolution recognized that the international
community would be increasingly in need of an international judicial organ for the trial of crimes under international law. Second,
the resolution invited the ILC to study both the desirability and the
possibility of establishing such an international judicial organ. Finally, the resolution required the ILC to consider the possibility of
establishing a criminal chamber within the International Court of
Justice.
After studying the question, the ILC concluded that an international criminal court was both possible and desirable, but recommended that it be a separate institution rather than a criminal
chamber of the International Court of Justice. Subsequently, in
1953, the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction sub270. Id. art. IX.

271. Id art. IV.
272. Id. art. VIII. The related acts are: (1) conspiracy to commit genocide; (2) direct and
public incitement to commit genocide; (3) an attempt to commit genocide; and (4) complicity
in the commission of the crime. Id. art. III.
273. Id art. VI.
274. G.A. Res. 260 (III)B, U.N. Doc. A/760, at 177 (1948).
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mitted a draft statute for a separate court. 2 7 5 The General Assembly concluded that the problems raised by the establishment of an
international criminal court were closely related to the question of
defining "aggression" and to the Proposed Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Thus, the General Assembly postponed consideration of an international criminal jurisdiction until it could consider all other reports on these related
questions.27 6 The realization that no genocide can be committed
without a state's commission or omission of any or all the elements
of the crime should be given careful consideration. Such acts
should be repressed not only because their apparent and immediate
victims are human beings, but also because they impair the peace
27 7
and security of mankind and threaten minimum world order.
C. The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind 278
In the Eichmann trial, genocide was said to be an international
crime. And yet, at the time of the commission of the offense, genocide was not listed as punishable in any code, as is the usual case
with crimes defined by municipal law. Nonetheless, nations seek to
establish principles and to agree to definitions of acceptable conduct which, it is hoped, will encourage civilized behavior. Since the
end of World War II, the United Nations has sought to agree on a
code of offenses considered to be against the peace and security of
mankind. This effort may yet prove successful.
In 1947, the ILC was directed to "formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nurernberg Tribunal and in [its] judgment . . . . and to prepare a draft code of
offenses against the peace and security of mankind, indicating
clearly the place to be accorded th[ese] principles."27' 9 The ILC did
not prepare a text of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace
275. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report to the General Assembly by the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
11) 21, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).

276. 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 23-26, U.N. Doc. A/2695 (1954). For a summary of
the matter, see Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.i, at 30-46 (1949).
277.

Reisman, Response to Crimes of Discriminationand Genocide. An Appraisal of the

Convention on the Eliminationof RacialDiscrimination,I DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 29 (1971).
278. Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 9) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Draft Code of Offenses];
see also Appendix G infra, p. 296.
279. G.A. Res. 177(11), U.N. Doc. A/505, at 1280 (1947).
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and Security of Mankind until

1954.280

Several reasons for delay have been suggested as being most
important. First, the ILC was unclear as to the General Assembly's
intention in affirming the Nuremberg Principles. Second, the ILC
was uncertain as to the meaning of "formulation of principles already affirmed." Finally, the ILC was uncertain whether "formulation" meant "a complete examination of the relationship between
international and municipal law."' 28 1 Undoubtedly, the most difficult problem for the ILC was dealing with the definition of "aggression," a key concept in the notion of peace and security.28 2 The
defendants at Nuremberg were found guilty of crimes against
peace, which included planning or waging a war of aggression. The
London Charter, however, did not define "aggression," and the
United Nations Charter assigns the determination of acts of aggression to the Security Council.2 83 The ILC was unable to define "acts
of aggression," although the Draft Code states that they include
"the employment by the authorities of a State of armed forces
against another State for any purpose other than national or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation
28 4
of a competent organ of the United Nations.
As crimes under international law, the Draft Code list: (1)
genocide (as it was defined in the Genocide Convention);2 5 (2)
"acts in violation of the laws and customs of war;' 28 6 and (3) acts
defined as crimes against humanity by the London Charter (without the qualification that they be committed in connection with the
waging of a war).287 A subtle distinction exists between "genocide"
and "crimes against humanity" as defined in the Draft Code. "Ge280. See Johnson, supra note 259, at 446-68.
281.

Id

at 446-47.

282. The concept ofjust and unjust wars has been struggled with for centuries, generally
unsuccessfully. See BRIERLY, supra note 137, at 28-35.
283. Johnson observed:
Its own Charter required that "aggression" be not defined. But the logical conclusion of the various actions of the General Assembly seemed to be that "aggression"
must be defined. If aggression were not defined, how could it be possible to prepare
satisfactorily a code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind in

which the Nirnberg principles would be accorded a place? Above all, how would
it be possible - if aggression were not defined - to reconcile the new Code with
the maxim nullum crimen sine lege which the General Assembly had affirmed in

such express terms when it adopted Article 11(2) of [the] Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?
Johnson, supra note 259, at 448-49.
284. Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 278, art. 2(1).
285. Id. art. 2(10).
286. Id. art. 2(12).
287. Id. art. 2(11).
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nocide" can be committed by a private individual or a state, while
"crimes against humanity" may be committed "by the authorities
of a state or by private individuals acting at the instigation of or with
the tolerationofsuch authorities. ' 288 In effect, there is no validity to
the distinction between the two crimes since they both involve
wholesale human depredation which could not occur without the
state's instigation or acquiescence. Presumably, a dissident group
within a state could seize a part of the state's territory and commit
such crimes against the state's will. In any event, the responsibility
of the individual actors is always at stake. A question could arise,
however, with respect to the responsibility of "superiors" and to the
collective responsibility of the state. This would depend, of course,
upon the degree of involvement or control the "superiors" and representatives of state agencies exercised over the situation, their ability to prevent the crime, and their failure to have taken appropriate
measures to do so.
By defining crimes against humanity as those violations of
human rights perpetrated by, or with the encouragement of, the
state, and by not utilizing this qualification when defining genocide,
the Draft Code illustrates the two factors which bring the violation
of human rights within the boundaries of international criminal
law. Violation of an individual's right to life, for example, is a
common crime, but when committed by the authorities of the state
it assumes added significance. Such a violation would be an "abuse
'
This state-sponsored outrage against the indiof sovereignty." 289
vidual is what Professor Drost refers to as "humanicide. '' 290 It is,
therefore, of concern to the world community.
In its usual form, genocide represents one category of humanicide. Genocide is a specific type of state-sponsored violation of
human rights. More specifically, international law takes cognizance of genocide not because of the identity of the criminal, as is
generally the case with crimes against humanity, but because of the
identity of the victims. "Genocide is291a crime against human rights
of persons collectively considered."
While the Draft Code has not yet been adopted by the General
Assembly, it must be noted that many of its provisions - such as
those concerning genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination are within the purview of other operative conventions. While the
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id (emphasis added).
P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: HUMANICIDE 348 (1959).
Id. at 347-48.
DROST, supra note 136, at 200.
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Slavery Convention292 itself does not make slavery a crime, it may
be construed to have done so when viewed with the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.293 Furthermore, persecution on social, political, racial, religious, or cultural grounds, which
is prohibited by the Draft Code,2 94 is equivalent to inequality
before the law. Though not defined as a crime, inequality before
the law is covered by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 295 and is now a proposed crime in the Draft Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.2 96
D.

of All Forms of Racial
The Convention on the Elimination
297
Discrimination

The multivalue deprivatory conditions which affect specific
groups led to the gradual realization that such conditions are
threatening to minimum world order. Events that preceded World
War II - and experiences during that period - revealed that a
rational nexus exists between such deprivatory conditions and what
came to be recognized as an international crime, such as genocide.
The realization, however, that a process of systematic human destruction is not only limited to physical extermination but also extends to other forms of dehumanization, led to the enunciation of
"human rights" guarantees under the United Nations and subsequent human rights covenants, treaties, and conventions. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
is the culmination of a historical development which characterizes
this type of conduct as a form of international deviance requiring
the formulation of legal norms to impede it. Article 1 of the Con292. Done Sept. 26, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, reprinted in 21
AM. J. INT'L L. 171 (Supp. 1927) (official documents), andin BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note

228, at 121-27.
293. Done Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, [1957] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 59 (Cmd. 257), T.I.A.S.
No. 3532, reprintedin BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at 128-34. See also Bassiouni &
Nanda, Slavery and Slave Trade.-Steps Toward Its Eradication,12 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 424
(1972).
294. See Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 278, art. 11.
295. See Discrimination Convention, infra note 297, arts. I & 5.
296. See 27 U.N. GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item 50), U.N. Doc. A/8880 (1971).
297. Openedfor Signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (entered intoforce Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Discrimination Convention]. On the Convention's background, see
Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,15 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 996 (1966).
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vention defines racial discrimination as
[any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other
field of public life.298
The specific rights guaranteed and protected by the Convention are set out in detail in article 5. The basic policy of article 1
applies essentially to citizens. Its application to noncitizens is ambiguous.29 9 It does not, for example, affect municipal laws on nationality, citizenship, or naturalization as long as they do not
discriminate against a particular nationality. 3" Article 1 further
provides:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure to
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed
racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do
not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights
for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued
after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved. 3 '
The exclusion stated therein is reiterated in article 2(l)(e) and article 2(2) as well as in article 6. For all of its breadth, article 1 does
have defects. As Professor Reisman states:
[Even] [w]hen paragraph 1 is balanced with paragraph 4, the predominant conception of racial discrimination continues to be one
of severe repression of the vigorous demands of a subjugated
group. Discrimination may start in this manner, but at some
point it becomes a reciprocal process. The great wound of continuing discrimination is its internalization in the target; the discriminated person who has, after years and perhaps generations
of alien acculturation, begun to adopt the image the discriminators hold of him and to doubt his own and his group's worth will
always lack sufficient self-awareness and self-confidence to avail
himself of the formal rights and prerogatives which the law purports to offer him. One of the most arduous and delicate challenges of the elimination of racial discrimination will be the
elimination of internalized or self-discrimination. This process
298.
299.
300.
301.

Discrimination Convention, supra note 297, art. 1.
Id. art. 1(2).
Id. art. 1(3).
Id. art. 1(4).
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may well involve violence to established structures and cultural
values within the discriminated group, for the elite of a discriminated group has often reached an accommodation with the surrounding society of discrimination and may view any change as
a threat to its own, limited ascendancy. The various claims
which will inevitably be raised in a program of elimination of
racial discrimination under international auspices will be much
more realistically handled if those authorized to apply the Convention operate with a grasp of 3the
enormity and complexity of
02
the problems confronting them.
Articles 2 through 7 of the Convention set out the substantive
obligations of contracting parties. Three basic undertakings appear
in these six articles: (1) a governmental obligation to eliminate,
within official processes, all forms of racial discrimination; (2) a
governmental obligation to eliminate discrimination by individuals
and organizations within the state; and (3) a governmental obligation to undertake a developmental program.
The Convention relies on five jurisdictional authorities as implementation processes: (1) the Security Council; (2) the General
Assembly; (3) the International Court of Justice; (4) United Nations
agencies (ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights); and
(5) the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.3 °3
This latter is the only new structure created by the Convention.
The Committee's function is to consider "legislative, judicial, administrative, or other measures" adopted by governments 3°4 and to
30 5
decide on claims submitted. The procedure is quite elaborate
and its implementation is likely to clarify the general substantive
provisions of the Convention while operating as a control mechanism.
E

State Responsibility and Human Rights

State responsibility hinges on the existence of an international
right or duty the transgression of which would cause certain consequences requiring the attachment of a remedy or sanction. The
302. Reisman, supra note 277, at 46-47.
303. Discrimination Convention, supra note 297, art. 8. This Committee shall be elected
by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by states parties to the Convention. It shall
consist of 18 individuals of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality who shall
serve in their individual capacity. Consideration will be given to an equitable geographical
distribution, and to the representation of the different forms of civilizations and principal
legal systems of the world. Id.
304. Id. art. 9.
305. See id. arts. 11-14.
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existence of state responsibility for violations of human rights depends, therefore, on the answers to the following questions: (1)
what are these rights and where do they originate?; (2) what is their
binding legal effect?; and (3) what sanctions apply and who shall
apply them? In judicial terms, these questions require analysis of
the following issues: (1) the legally binding nature of human rights;
(2) the self-executing nature of obligations to preserve and protect
human rights; (3) the penetration of international law into municipal law; and (4) the enforcement of human rights provisions. A
complete treatment of these questions is beyond the scope of this
analysis; however, some general observations must be made.
An initial observation focuses on the attitudes of municipal
courts towards internationally protected human rights. Too frequently, decisions in cases alleging human rights violations stress
the distinction between violations of international law and violations of municipal law. Once this dichotomy is accepted, it is relatively simple for municipal courts to consider themselves
jurisdictionally unimpaired by violations of international law and
competent to proceed with the case as if the violation of international law did not exist. The rationale sustaining this dichotomy
between violations of internal law and violations of international
law is predicated on the doctrine of sovereignty whereby international law has only limited penetration into municipal law. But it
also rests on one interpretive approach to the doctrine of separation
of powers in municipal law. Under this approach, violations of international law are deemed within the prerogatives of the executive
and not the judiciary; furthermore, municipal courts assert that
they have no enforceable sanctioning powers over such violations
only the executive can deal with such questions. Governments,
on the other hand, argue that human rights are nonenforceable by
municipal courts for a variety of reasons, including: (1) except as
provided by treaty, there are no binding international sanctions for
violations of human rights; (2) except as provided by treaty, there
are no existing binding obligations arising out of internationally
enunciated human rights that are applicable to municipal courts;
and (3) self-executing enforcement of internationally enunciated
human rights violates state sovereignty. The validity of these assertions in the present state of international law is by no means as
clear-cut as either the proponents of human rights or the proponents of state sovereignty claim. In fact, no other area of international law is as riddled with confusion between lex lata and legge
ferenda as is the literature on the international protection of human
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1

60

International Law Journal: Table of Contents
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST

rights. Occasionally, one may even find some arguments in the nature of lex desiderata which are incorrectly advanced as lex lata.
The central issue is not whether there are human rights 3" but
whether there are rules for the protection of human rights with
enough specific content to be deemed legally binding on states and
to require enforcement. Thus, there is a need to identify the
sources of these rights. And there is a further need to determine
whether these sources refer to a specfc right, that is, one with a
sufficiently defined content requiring a sanction-remedy and applying to unlawful seizures and irregular rendition practices. The applicable sources of international law include the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, multilateral
treaties, decisions of international courts, and United Nations resolutions. This classification is based upon the degree of applicability
and binding nature of specific obligations within the meaning of
internationally protected human rights.
The United Nations Charter refers to respect for human rights
in articles 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55(c), 62(2) and 76(c). The language of
article 55 is quite revealing:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well
being, which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(c) Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
This language has been considered by some as a statement of principles or as a goal, while others read it as stating Charter obligations. Article 56, however, states: "[a]ll members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
This clear statement does not define the specific content of the obligation, but the existence of an obligation to the "achievement of the
purposes" of human rights cannot be questioned.
A comprehensive summary of the issues over the obligation
imposed by the Charter and the arguments of the proponents of
306. See Bassioun, The "Human Rights Program" The Veneer of Civilization Thickens,
21 DE PAUL L. REV. 271 (1971). See also SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235.
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various positions has been made by Professor Schwelb. °7 One answer appears in the position of the International Court of Justice in
its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of Sough Africa in Namibia (South West Africa 3 08 which was unequivocal in the recognition that the Charter
imposes human rights obligations on member states and that the
obligations are self-executing. The court stated that South African
apartheid laws and decrees "constitute a violation of the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 3" The Court
further held that
[u]nder the charter of the United Nations, the former mandatory
had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory on international states, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinctions as to race. To establish, indeed to enforce,
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations, restrictions
and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes
and principles of the charter.3
Thus, by enunciating its purposes and principles on human rights,
the Charter establishes self-executing obligations that acquire their
specific content from the Charter as well as from other sources of
internationally protected human rights.
The issue appears to be whether the Charter, having established certain general principles and purposes, can be said to incorporate specific rights which, by virtue of the evolutionary nature of
human rights, have developed and will continue to develop through
various sources of international law. The answer is in the affirmative and, therefore, these specific rights must be ascertained to determine their applicability. As a proponent of human rights, this
writer maintains that human rights should be considered interpretive of the Charter and become self-executing under article 56.
One may raise the question of the legally binding effects of the
Human Rights Declaration. One school of thought contends that
since it is a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration has no
binding effect upon states. Another view holds that the Declaration
interprets Charter obligations. The most persuasive argument is
found in the separate opinion of Vice President Ammoun of the
307. Schwelb. The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter,66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972).
308. [1971] I.C.J. 16.
309. Id. at 57.
310. Id.
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International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal
ConsequencesforStates of the ContinuedPresenceof South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa). Vice President Ammoun states:
The Advisory Opinion takes judicial notice of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. In the case of certain of the Declaration's provisions, attracted by the conduct of South Africa, it
would have been an improvement to have dealt in terms with
their comminatory nature, which is implied in paragraphs 130
and 131 of the Opinion by the references to their violation.
In its written statement the French Government, alluding to
the obligations which South Africa accepted under the Mandate
and assumed on becoming a Member of the United Nations, and
to the norms laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, stated that there was no doubt that the Government of
South Africa had, in a very real sense, systematically infringed
those rules and those obligations. Nevertheless, referring to the
mention by resolution 2145 (XXI) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, it objected that it was plainly impossible for
non-compliance with the norms it enshrined to be sanctioned
with the revocation of the Mandate, inasmuch as that Declaration was not in the nature of a treaty binding upon states.
Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua international convention within the meaning of Article
38, paragraph l(a), of the Statute of the Court, they can bind
states on the basis of custom within the meaning of paragraph
1(b), of the same Article, whether because they constituted a codification of customary law, as was said in respect of Article 6 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; or, because they
have acquired the force of custom through a general practice accepted as law, in the words of Article 38, paragraph l(b) of the
Statute. One right which must certainly be considered a preexisting binding customary norm, which the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights codified, is the right to equality, which, by
common consent has ever since the remotest times been deemed
inherent in human nature.
It is not by mere chance that in Article I of the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man there stands, so worded, this
primordial principle or axiom: 'All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights.'
From this first principle flow most rights and freedoms. The
ground was thus prepared for the legislative and constitutional
process which began with the first declarations or bills of rights
in America and Europe, continued with the constitutions of the
nineteenth century, and culminated in positive international law
in the San Francisco, Bogota and Addis Ababa charters, and in
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which has been confirmed by numerous resolutions of the United Nations, in particular, the above-mentioned declarations adopted by the General
and 2627(XXV).
Assembly in resolutions 1514(XV), 2625 (XXV)
311
The Court in its turn has now confirmed it.
A quarter of a century ago, the Declaration of Human Rights
expressed the consensus of the member states. Since then it has
become a part of those general principles of international law recognized by civilized nations. Thus, the provisions of the Declaration can be construed as legally binding because they interpret the
principles and purposes of the Charter, which contemplated such
rights as enunciated by the Declaration as if article 55 incorporates
the Declaration by anticipation. Furthermore, as part of international law's "general principles," the transgression of its norms
could constitute a violation of international law to which state responsibility would attach.
Throughout the limited history of prosecution of international
crimes - which focused on the waging and initiation of unjust or
aggressive war and since Nuremberg for "crimes against humanity"
- direct responsibility under international law has been placed on
individuals. That does not, however, exclude the responsibility of
the state for international crimes, which is analogous to the municipal criminal law concept of corporate responsibility. It is embodied
in the doctrine and practice of international reparations, which is a
hybrid between a criminal fine and civil damages.3 12 It should be
noted that whenever war reparations were imposed, they took one
of the following forms: (1) seizure by the victor of properties of the
defeated party; (2) the imposition of economic compensation; or (3)
the cession of territory by "agreement" of the defeated party.
The development of the concept of state responsibility for
crimes of state, such as the initiation of aggressive war or other violations such as "crimes against humanity," have certainly affirmed
13
the principle of a state's international criminal responsibility.
311. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 76.
312. See E. ARONEANU, LE CRIME CONTRE L'HUMANITE (1961); V. PELLA, LA
CRIMINALITE COLLECTIVE DES ETATS ET LE DROIT PENAL DE L'AVENIR (1949); Glaser,

L'Etal en Tant Que Personne Morale Est-il Pinalment Responsable?, 29 REVUE DE DROIT
451 (1948). See also V. PELLA, LA GUERRE-CRIME ET LES

PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE

CRIMINELS DE GUiRRE: REFLECTIONS SUR LA JUSTICE PE'NALE INTERNATIONALE

(1946).

313. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Internationally Wrongful
Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246/Add. 1-3
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Though international law has developed some guidelines for
wrongful acts committed by states, none exist with respect to a
state's criminal liability other than by analogy. 1 4 Nevertheless, the
Treaty of Versailles remains a landmark in the imposition of state
responsibility, 315 as does the practice of World War I Allies against
Germany and Turkey, and World War II Allies against Germany,
Italy, and Japan. After World War II, the Federal Republic of
Germany paid substantial reparations to survivors of concentration
camps, to the families of the deceased, and to the State of Israel on
behalf of those Jews whom the Nazi regime had exterminated. The
principles of state responsibility extend to the collective responsibility of a state for individual acts of violations of international criminal law under the 1907 Hague Convention, which states that "[a]
belligerent party which violated the provision of the said regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part
of its armed forces."3' 16 The same approach is embodied in the
1949 Geneva Conventions.
The few cases of ad hoc international prosecution of war
(1971), reprinted in [19711 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
Ser.A/1971/Add.I (Part 1), citing landmark decisions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and International Court of Justice as well as arbitral decisions; see also
M. WHITEMAN, I & VII DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973); A. VERDROSS, VOLKERRECHT (5th ed. 1964); G. BALLADORE-PALLIERI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO (8th ed.
1962); C. ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1944); P.
GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1944); OPPENHEIM, supra note 52; G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1957); J. PERSONNAZ, LA REPARATION
DU PREJUDICE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1938); C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); C. DE VISSCHER, I & II LA RESPONSABILITE
DES ETATS (1924); D. Anzilotti, Teoria Generale Della Responsabilita Della Stato del Diritto
Internazionale, in D. ANZILLOTII, CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (1928); K. STRUPP,
II HANDBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS-DAS VOLKERRECHLICHE DELIKT (1933); E. VATTEL,
LE DROIT DES GENS (1758).
314. Munch, State Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in I BASSIOUNI &
NANDA, supra note 25, at 143; Triffterer, Jurisdiction over Statesfor Crimes of State, in I1A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 143 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); 0.
TRIFFTERER, DOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES MATERIELLEN
VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS SEIT NURNBERG (1966); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

(1963); F.

(1963); G.
(1956). The term ddlit international is
attributed to G. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPLES ET SYSTEMATIQUE (1932).
315. See JESCHECK, supra note 33; F. BERBER, DIKTAT VON VERSAILLES (1939); J.CASTILLON, LES REPARATIONS ALLEMANDE-DEUx
EXPERIENCES: 1919-1932, 1945-1952
(1953).
316. Regulations, supra note 50, art. 3.
317. See Prisoners of War Convention, supra note 140, art. 131; Protection of Civilians
Convention, supra note 140, art. 148; Wounded and Sick Convention, supra note 140, art. 5I;
Wounded at Sea Convention, supra note 140, art. 52.
USE OF FORCE BY STATES

MUNCH, DAS VOLKERRECHLICHE DELIKT

DAHM, ZUR PROBLEMATIK DES VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS
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crimes reveals the difficulties inherent in such an approach. Surely
they disclose the absence of a worldwide political will to pursue a
direct enforcement system at an international level.
III.

CONCLUSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
PROGRAM

Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the United Nation's General Assembly in 1948, the common aspirations of mankind have been symbolized by an extraordinary and unprecedented outpouring of concern for increased
protection of all basic human rights. This activity set in motion
demands for the codification of human rights law, to be accompanied by effective measures of implementation. As a result, there is
today an impressive catalogue of human rights recognized in various conventions, treaties, agreements, and protocols covering almost every aspect of mankind's basic values.31 8 But there are few
tasks which have had less fulfillment than the realization of the basic values of mankind. Indeed, the formulation of world community aspirations is a far cry from their translation into authoritative

proscriptions. 1 9
The uneven progression of the "Human Rights Program"
should not obscure the fact that some advances have been made.
The lack of progress is due in no small part to the latent ambiguities contained in the very concept of human rights.3 2 ° Those ambiguities are inherent in the formulation and actuation of human
rights as a social process with roots ascertainable in individual and
318. See generally Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/4 (1967).
319. Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations,21 DE PAUL L. REV. 307 (1972).
320. Moskowitz succinctly poses the problem:
[I]nternational human rights is still waiting for its theoretician to systematize the
thoughts and speculations on the subject and to define desirable goals. Intelligent
truisms do not necessarily add up to a theory. No one has yet arisen to draw together a positive synthesis of the facts and fancies which emerge daily from events
of bewildering complexity and to carry on an authentic debate. International concern with human rights is still very much a theme begging for a writer. And the
scholar has not yet appeared to redress the distortions through a calm and systematic application of facts, to ground abstractions in the specific, and to define the
limits of discourse. In the absence of a definite body of doctrine, as well as of
deeply rooted convictions, international human rights have been dealt with on the
basis of the shifts and vagaries of daily affairs and of evocations of daily events.
There is a great need for technical resources and ability to channel the facts to
greater effect. Human rights as a matter of international concern is an untrodden
area of systematic research. But still a greater need is for superlative virtuosity to
deal with international human rights in their multiple human dimensions.
M. MosKowiTz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98-99 (1968).
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collective basic values. The recognition and at least limited application of authoritative proscriptions in specific areas - for example, slavery - confirms the need to avoid these ambiguities. Thus,

the scope of the inquiry must be narrowed to specifics by applying
means which are commensurate with the gradual development of
human aspirations. 3"2 '

The minimum indispensable requirements for a dignified
human existence include the rights of life, liberty, and equality.32 2
These three rights have been expressed in specific conventions
prohibiting genocide, slavery, forced prostitution, and racial discrimination.3 2 3 Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol,3 24 in addition to the 3In25
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
offers a wide spectrum of protection regarding life, liberty, equality,
and human dignity. The United Nations has several bodies
charged with the implementation of human rights. Some United
Nations sponsored human rights treaties have even created their
own enforcement mechanisms, such as the United Nations Division
of Human Rights, the Commission on Human Rights, the SubCommission on the Protection of Minorities and Elimination of
Discrimination, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.3 26
321. McDougal, Lasswel &Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order. 4 Framework
for Policy-Orienled Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969).
322. See id. at 267. Let it be said immediately that a certain minimum of values indispensable to a dignified human existence must be prescribed as immune from all claims of
derogation at all times. Notable among these are the right to life, freedom from torture and
inhuman treatment, freedom from involuntary human experimentations, freedom from slavery, the slave trade and servitude, freedom from imprisonment for debt, freedom from retroactive application of criminal punishment, the right to recognition as a human being, and
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. These rights and freedoms are indispensable
to a dignified human existence and must remain wholly intact from derogation upon grounds
of crisis. In terms of our basic postulation, it can never be necessary to encroach upon these
rights and freedoms, even in time of emergency. Nor would their deprivation ever be proportional. If the emerging concept ofjus cogens is to be given rational meaning in the context of a world public order of human dignity, its bedrock must be in this minimal protection
of human rights.
323. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 255; Discrimination Convention, supra
note 297. See also McDougal & Arens, supra note 255. A Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppresion of Torture is now before the United Nations. See Bassiouni & Derby,
An Appraisal of Torture in International Law and Practice.- The Needfor an International
Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENAL 16 (1977).

324. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
325. Id. at 49.
326. See generally SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 505-913.
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It has not been only the United Nations, by way of resolution,
declaration, and convention that has sought to define and protect

human rights. Efforts have been conducted on a regional basis
which have culminated in conventions securing the same rights that
have been declared fundamental by the United Nations. One of
these is the American Convention on Human Rights3 27 which is
patterned after United Nations sponsored human rights treaties.
The other is the European Convention on Human Rights,32 8 signed
in Rome in 1950, which is the prototype of non-United Nations
sponsored treaties, the purpose of which is to promote and protect

human rights.
The European Convention is like many United Nations sponsored treaties in that it requires contracting parties to agree to take
the necessary steps to secure the rights affirmed in the Convention.
It is unlike certain United Nations sponsored conventions (the Ge-

nocide Convention, for example), which rely upon United Nations
structures for their implementation.3 29 Nevertheless, United Nations sponsored human rights conventions contain effective provisions for their implementation, 330 whereas the European
33
Convention provides for a European Court of Human Rights '
and the possibility for individuals to petition the European Human
Rights Commission 332 to insure the effective implementation of
327. Done Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/ 1.1 (Nov. 1969); see also the American Declaration of the Human Rights and Duties
of Man, Resolution XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotd,
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, FinalAct (Pan-American Union 1948) 48; The Establishment of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.
L/V/I1.17 Dec. 1967.

See SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1267; Cabranes,

Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147
(1967); Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes, 21
BUFFALO L. REV. 121 (1971); Thomas & Thomas, Human Rights and the Organization of
American States, 12 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 319 (1972).

328. Done Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, [1953] Gr. Brit. T.S. 71 (Cmd. 8969) (entered
intoforce Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. See generally SoHN &
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 999-1266; F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1975).
329. See generally SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1267-1373.
330. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39-51.

331. European Convention, supra note 328, art. 19(2). See also id. arts. 38-56.
332. See id. arts. 20-37. Cases alleging a state's failure to uphold the provisions of the
Convention do not go directly to the court; they must first be heard by the Human Rights
Commission which then may send the case to the court, or it may be brought to the court in
certain circumstances after the Commission has attempted to settle the case. If the court
finally does reach a decision, the judgment is final and binding on the parties who have
agreed to be bound by the Convention. See id. arts. 47, 48, 52 & 53.
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human rights.3 33
The performance of the European Commission on Human
Rights has proven to be less spectacular than expected. Of the first
3,797 petitions received from individuals, it accepted only 52 for
consideration. 334 Nevertheless, the Convention still signifies an important development in the growth of international law. The efforts
it represents, however imperfect and disappointing, as well as the
efforts represented by all international agreements seeking to protect human rights, must not be abandoned. 335 As M. Teitgen of
France reported to the Council of Europe in 1949:
Democracies do not become Nazi Countries in one day. Evil
progresses cunningly .... One by one, freedoms are suppressed
... . Public opinion and the entire national conscience are asphyxiated. And then, when everything is in order, the 'Fuhrer'is
installed and the evolution continues even to the oven of the crematorium. It is necessary to intervene before it is too late. A
conscience must exist somewhere which will sound the alarm to
the minds of a nation menaced by this progressive corruption, to
warn them of the peril and to show them that they are progressing down a long road which leads far, sometimes even to Buchenwald or Dachau. An international court. . . and a system of
supervision and guarantees could be the conscience of which we
all have need . .. 336
These proposed ideas are not at variance with those of the
many scholars who have proposed the codification of international
criminal law and the creation of an international criminal court
with an enforcement mechanism.3 37 Its likelihood may be in ques333. A State must specially declare that it recognizes the competence of the Commission
to receive individual petitions. Id. art. 25. As of 1973, 12 states had so declared. See SOHN
& BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1009.
334. For a general discussion and history of the functioning of the European Human
Rights Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, see SOHN & BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 235, at 999-1265; Robertson, The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1950); Weil, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1963); Greenberg & Shalit, New Horizons
for Human Rights: The European Convention, Court, and Commission 0/Human Rights, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (1963); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1977).

335. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at 338.
336. Robertson, The Political Background and HistoricalDevelopment of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 24, 25 (Supp. No. 11) (1965), quotedin
SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1002.

337. See Dautricourt, supra note 302, at 636; Kos-Rabcewicz Zubkowski, The Creationof
an InternationalCriminalCourt, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 519

(M. Bassiouni ed. 1975); Grebing, La Cration d'une Cour PinaleInternationale,45 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENAL 435 (1975); Markus, Les Possibiliteset les Conditions de la
JurisdictionPinaleInternationale,45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PiNAL 453 (1975).
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tion, however, since the trend is to pursue an indirect control model
instead of the direct control model which the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction would reflect.3 3
The "Holocaust" is all too often left only to Jews to remember
and to commemorate. Yet, the "Holocaust" is not merely a Jewish
tragedy, it is the tragedy of all mankind. Consequently, the "Holocaust" must not gradually become the exclusive concern of one
people but must be considered a part of the history of all people.
Never again! must become the motto of all humankind; otherwise,
it would be too facile to rationalize such events as simply the result
of intergroup conflict, as has been the case, for example, with regard to Biafrans, the people of Bangladesh, black southern Africans, and the Palestinians.3 39 It is all a matter of degree. Should
the observance of human rights not become truly universalized,
both in theory and in practice, acceptance of human depredation
becomes all too inviting.
The conscience of the world must be constantly reminded of
the "Holocaust" and other similar events so that genocide and
other serious human depredations may be avoided in the future.
What is at stake is the very preservation of humanity and the thin
veneer of its civilization. To that end the rule of law should be
strengthened to become the barrier between atavism and humanism. This article is written in the spirit of universal humanism and
with a view to advance respect for and observation of basic human
rights for all peoples of the world regardless of race, religion, color,
ethnic origin, or sex.

For two comprehensive texts on the subject, see TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (J. Stone & R. Woetzel eds. 1970); P. CARJEU, PROJET D'UNE JURISDICTION PiNALE INTERNATIONALE (1953).

338. See generally Bassiouni, An Appraisal ofthe Growth and Developing Trends ofInternational Criminal Law, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL 405 (1975).
339. See M.C. BASSIOUNI, THE PALESTINIAN'S RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE (1978).
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APPENDIX A
HAS THE UNITED STATES COMMITTED GENOCIDE
AGAINST THE AMERICAN INDIAN?
The question whether the United States, for the past 200 years,
has committed genocide against the American Indian does not admit an easy answer. The confusion lies in determining (1) what is
required to be convicted of genocide, and (2) what has been the
past and present policy of the government toward the American
Indian. The most widely accepted international statement of what
constitutes genocide is found in the Genocide Convention.'
Initially, there are two major obstacles to charging the United
States with genocide, neither of which will be considered here.
First, can the United States be charged and convicted of a crime
which it has never acknowledged? - the United States has never
ratified the Genocide Convention.2 Second, can a government be
3
charged with genocide at all?

Aside from the above problems, the major issue in determining
whether the United States has been guilty of committing genocide
against the American Indian is whether the "specific intent" element has been present. The Genocide Convention defines the
crime as:
[those acts] committed with intent to destroy, in whole or inpart, a

national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction; ....
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signatureDec. 8, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, (1949) Can. T.S. No. 27 (entered intoforce Jan.
12, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention].
2. Accord, Bedau, Genocide in Vietnam?, 53 B.U. L. REV. 574, 583 (1973).
3. The Convention provides that only "persons" can be charged with Genocide: "Persons committing genocide shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. IV.
To charge a government with this crime would require a loose interpretation of the meaning
of article IV. See Bedau, supra note 2, at 582.
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Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
One can recall numerous horrible accounts of atrocities committed against the Indians - Trail of Tears and Wounded Knee, to
name but two. Yet, it would appear to be a difficult task to prove
that the United States acted with the requisite "specific intent." It
has been argued that one can imply the mental element to commit
genocide by circumstantial proof where a large number of victims
have been affected.' However, the contrary position seems to be
the prevailing view. For example, atrocities committed against the
American blacks6 and against the South Vietnamese both fail to
qualify as acts of genocide because the requirement of an actual,
specific intent can not be proven with either a constructive or an
implied malice model.'
If we assume that there is an actual, specific intent required for
the commission of the crime of genocide, it is difficult to prove any
violation of the Genocide Convention by the United States, especially before 1887. For example, from 1790 to 1834 there were several statutes enacted for the purpose of removing Indians from
desirable Eastern lands to the West - away from civilization.
Notwithstanding the massive loss of life, there appears to be no evidence that these statutes were enacted with the "intent" to destroy
the Indians. An example of this type of act was the "Trail of
Tears," a forced migration of thousands of Indians from Georgia to
Oklahoma.8 The Removal Act,9 which authorized much of this
senseless loss of life, had as its purpose the civilization and education of the Indian.' 0 In 1835, President Jackson said that he felt the
Indians would have a better chance of survival if they were moved
West."I It would seem, then, that the specific genocidal intent was
lacking up to this point. Although isolated army and government
(d)

4. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. II (emphasis added).
5. Comment, The UnitedStates andthe 1948 GenocideConvention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J.
683, 692 (1975).
6. Goldberg & Gardner, Time To Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A. J. 141,
144 (1972).
7. Bedau, supra note 2, at 599-620.
8.

A. JOSEPHY, THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 323 (Bantam ed. 1966).

9. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to Preserve
Peace on the Frontiers, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
10. Reid, Conflict and Injustice.'A Discussionoffrancis PaulPracha's "'AmericanIndian
Policy in the Formative Years," 39 N.D. L. REv. 50, 53-54 (1963).
11. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 260-61 (7th ed. H. Commager 1963).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1

72

International Law Journal: Table of Contents
GENOCIDE

AND THE AMERICAN

INDIAN

officials might have had the specific intent, it has not been conclusively established that a nexus exists between their individual motives and official government policy.
The next era of American Indian-United States relations was
heralded with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887,12
by which tribal land was distributed to individual Indians. The
concept of assimilation - assimilating one culture into another does not appear in the Act's preamble.' 3 However, it would appear
from debates and other reports that assimilation was in fact the actual goal. 4 And it should be noted that this legislation did not terminate tribal existence if the Indians so elected; thus the Indians
were able to preserve their tribal identity.' 5 In the New Deal, this
6
policy was temporarily halted with the Indian Reorganization Act'
which attempted to reorganize the tribal units. In 1953, the latter
policy again seemed to be reversed by House Concurrent Resolution 108'7 which was to end Federal regulation of Indians. The
purpose of the Act' 8 was to end encroachments on the freedom of
Indians - part of a major goal of the Eisenhower Administration
to limit big government.' 9
It can be seen through this period - from 1887 - that the
requisite specific intent would be difficult to prove, particularly
from the New Deal forward. It might be argued that the aim of the
General Allotment Act of 1887 was to assimilate the American Indian, which could be construed as containing the requisite intent to
commit genocide. By "assimilation" is not meant necessarily that
the formulators of the policy wished to "destroy" the group, but
rather that they intended to "change" the group. As one government official noted at the time, "[t]he American Indian is to become
the Indian American."'2 The Indian tribe itself was not prohibited
from existing. While it cannot be denied that numerous atrocities
12. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 338 (1887), as amended by 25 U.S.C. 331358 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Allotment Act].
13. Id.
14. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 208-09 (1942).

15.
16.
(1934),
17.

United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
Indian Reorganization Act, Organization of Indian Tribes, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987
as amended by 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1976).
Resolution on the Status of Indians in the United States, H.R. Cong. Res. 108, 83d

Cong., IstSess., 99 CONG. REC. 10815 (1953).
18. Indian Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1976).
19. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 582-83 (1974).
20. Statement of Commissioner Morgan of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, July 1, 1889,
citedin R. BURNETTE & J. KOSTER,THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 147 (Bantam ed. 1974).
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were committed against American Indians, the requisite "specific
intent" of the United States to commit genocide has not been established.

APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
United States involvement in Vietnam raised several controversial issues in the area of international law.' Two such questions
are: (1) whether the United States was guilty of genocide;2 and (2)
whether the United States committed "war crimes" in Southeast
Asia.3
In light of the definition of genocide,4 there are at least three
essential elements to be considered in determining the material element and the mental element needed to prove a charge of genocide:
(1) the existence of a separate national, ethnical, racial, or religious group sufficiently distinct and identifiable to be capable of
identification as a victim of genocidal acts; (2) the commission of
acts performed as part of a plan to destroy, in whole or in part, this
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group; and (3) a specific intent to destroy this group as a whole or in part. None of these elements are present in the facts surrounding United States activities
in Southeast Asia. This is true for a number of reasons.
First, the opposing parties in the Vietnam conflict did not include a separate national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The
nature of the Vietnam conflict was, at one time, a subject of strong
political controversy. It has now, however, been internationally
1. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085 (1968); Moore, InternationalLaw and
the United States Role in Viet Nam; 4 Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051 (1976).
2. See Bedau, Genocidein Vietnam?, 53 B.U. L. REV. 574 (1973); Goldberg & Gardner,
Time To Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A. J. 141 (1972); Phillips & Deutsch, Pitfalls
of the Genocide Convention, 56 A.B.A. J. 641 (1970).
3. Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 ORE. L. REV. 260 (1970).
4. See text accompanying note 5, Appendix A supra. At present, the United States is
not a party to this Convention. See note 213 supra, p. 264. Several respected members of the
American legal community have suggested, however, that the United States reconsider its
position. See Goldberg & Gardner, supra note 2, Bitker, Genocide Revisited, 56 A.B.A.J. 71
(1970). But see Phillips & Deutsch, supra note 2. For a discussion of this Convention, see
Bassiouni, Genocideand Racial Discrimination,in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 522 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973).
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recognized as a civil war. The United States allied itself in this
conflict with the South Vietnamese nationals and directed its activities against the Viet Cong, a term designating members of the insurgent military force. The Viet Cong did not qualify as, nor did
they ever claim to be, a separate national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.5 In fact, the national, ethnical, racial, and religious
composition of the South Vietnamese nationals and the Viet Cong
were essentially identical. The only groups so strongly concentrated on one side as to be conceivably in a position to suffer genocide were the Catholics, Cao Dais, and Montagnards, all on the
South Vietnamese-American side. The absence of the one essential
element of an identifiable group alone invalidates any possible
charge of genocide that might conceivably be made against the
United States as a result of its activities in Vietnam.6
Second, American activities in Vietnam could not be classified
as part of a coordinated plan to destroy in whole or inpart any particular national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The sole American actions which might arguably approximate such acts were the
establishment of free fire zones and massive bombing raids on
North Vietnam. These actions, however, clearly do not qualify, although they could constitute war crimes. However, the factors of
"military necessity" and "proportionality" must be considered. Article 22 of the Hague Regulations7 establishes that the means by
which one party may inflict injury upon another are not unlimited.
Such means are subject to scrutiny in light of the military necessity
of the particular tactical situation involved. Furthermore, article 23
of the Hague Regulations establishes that there must be some "proportionality" between the amount and type of force used and the
legitimate military objective that is being sought, so that unnecessary injury and destruction are avoided. Additionally, military operations conducted as acts of political reprisal must not be out of
proportion to the provocation received.8 There is, however, a pre5. There have been attempts to expand the definitions of national, ethnical, racial, and
religious groups beyond those commonly accepted at present by the international community. See Niset, La Sous-Commission de la Lutte Contre les Mesures Diseriminatoires el de la
Protectiondes Minoriikms des Nations Unies a Sa Vingi-Sixilme Session, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS J.
565 (1973) (attempt to classify Marxism as a religion, thus making all anti-Marxist acts genocidal). Such attempts, however, have not been successful.
6. A different conclusion might have been possible had the parties in the conflict been
clearly separable for national, ethnical, racial, or religious reasons. This would be the case in
a hypothetical conflict between the Serbians and Croatians in Yugoslavia. This, however,
was not the case in Vietnam.
7. See note 50 supra, p. 209.
8. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 401 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
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sumption of legitimacy given to any particular military operation.
Proof of a violation of either the "principle of necessity" or of the
"principle of proportionality" must be established before a charge
of committing war crimes may be confirmed.
As to any charges of genocide, citing the establishment of free
fire zones or United States bombing raids on North Vietnam, it
may be noted that the inhabitants of proposed free fire zones were
warned to, evacuate the area prior to official designation of these
zones. Those who remained did so voluntarily, and they did not
constitute a separate national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.
Hence, any injuries suffered by them cannot be deemed genocidal.
Moreover, in bombing North Vietnam, the United States utilized
an internationally recognized military tactic against a legitimate
military target.' Specific individual casualties of noncombatants
which resulted either during these raids or during other legitimate
military operations were incidental to these operations. While special provision is made for such incidents in international law,'o they
are not classified as genocidal acts.
Third, American activities in Vietnam were not conducted
with sufficient intent to support a charge of genocide. It is firmly
established that the crime of genocide is one of specific intent."'
There is insufficient evidence to indicate that there was any specific
intent, either expressed or implied, on the part of the United States
to destroy in whole or in part, any national, ethnical, racial, or reli-

gious group." Absent such a specific intent, no charge of genocide
can validly be made against the United States.
In conclusion, it may be noted that the absence of any one of
the three essential elements of genocide sufficiently invalidates a
charge of this offense. That all three essential elements are absent
in the case of American involvement in Southeast Asia definitively
establishes the innocence of
defeats such an accusation and firmly
3
matter.'
this
in
States
the United
9. MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 822 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).

10. Id. at 819.
11. See Bedau, supra note 2, at 580.
12. For a discussion of different models suggested to imply specific intent, see Bedau,
supra note 2, at 599-620.
13. There are those who have reached an opposite conclusion. For example, Bertrand
Russell, together with his Peace Foundation, organized a nongovernmental International
War Crimes Tribunal. This Tribunal, in 1967, found the United States guilty of acts of
genocide in Vietnam. This finding, however, had such a minute discernible effect in this
country that one may doubt the credibility of the Russell Tribunal as a substantial commentator on international affairs. See Bedau, supra note 2, at 574-75.
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The question of United States guilt has also been suggested in
relation to the occasional war crimes that occurred in the more than
a decade of American involvement in Southeast Asia. None of
these, however, was ever found to be part of a larger plan calling
for the extermination, in whole or in part, of any given national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group. The My Lai Massacre was the
most widely publicized example of a war crime involving American
personnel in Vietnam. The incident at Son My (My Lai) occurred
on March 16, 1968. Lieutenant Calley, the principal offender involved, was charged with four counts, alleging premeditated murder of 107 male and female Vietnamese civilians in the village of
Son My. Two additional counts were added, alleging the premeditated murder of a Vietnamese adult and a Vietnamese child of approximately two years of age. Because no United States civilian
court had jurisdiction, trial was conducted by military court-martial under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
On November 24, 1969, Major General Orwin Talbott, OG, Fort
Benning, Georgia, determined that there was sufficient evidence to
warrant a trial and referred the charges against Lieutenant Calley
for trial by general court martial. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Lieutenant Calley's platoon encountered no hostile fire
in the village, and that the only casualty was a soldier who shot
himself in the foot. The evidence indicated that the people that
Lieutenant Calley was charged with killing were unresisting, unarmed, and that they had come completely within the control of
Lieutenant Calley and his troops. Impanelling of the court began
on November 12, 1970. The prosecution began to present its case
on November 17, 1970. The court, on March 29, 1971, found Lieutenant Calley guilty of premeditated murder of not less than 22
noncombatant Vietnamese civilians and of assault with intent to
murder one Vietnamese noncombatant civilian. On March 31,
1971, he was sentenced for life to confinement at hard labor, total
forfeiture of all pay allowances, and dismissal from the service.
Action was also taken against two sergeants in Calley's Company; both were court-martialed for intent to murder. These men,
however, were acquitted. Several of Calley's superiors were administratively reprimanded for alleged attempts to cover up the My Lai
incident. For example, Major General Samuel Moster, Calley's Division commander, was demoted and stripped of his Distinguished
Service Medal by Army Secretary Stanley Resor for failure to adequately investigate the My Lai incident. By May, 1971, twentyfour men were charged by the Army with violations of the Uniform
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Code of Military Justice. Proceedings against twenty-three of these
men resulted in the charges being dropped or in acquittal.
The prosecution of these individuals, and the conviction of
Lieutenant Calley, clearly establishes that their conduct at My Lai
was not an authorized part of planned American activities."4 Furthermore, all United States armed forces personnel were instructed
in the nature of and penalties for war crimes. 5 They were required, as a part of their standing orders, to report immediately the
occurrence of any such crimes when detected. These procedures
clearly establish that any United States personnel who committed
war crimes in Vietnam broke the bond of agency between themselves and the United States government prior to the commission of
such acts. These war crimes, therefore, cannot be viewed as official
acts of the United States government. The fact that at least 21 other
United States personnel were convicted by the United States government for war crimes in Vietnam confirms that the commission
of these offenses was neither the intent nor the desire of the United
States.

APPENDIX C
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG:
INDICTMENT'
I. The United States of America, the French Republic, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics by the undersigned, Robert H.Jackson,
Francois de Menthon, Hartley Shawcross and R.A. Rudenko, duly
appointed to represent their respective Governments in the investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of the major war
criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of London dated 8th August,
1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth, of Crimes
against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of a
14. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths andLeadership Responsibility, 57 MIL. L.
REV. 99 (1972).

15. Westerman, A New Approach in Disseminating the Geneva Conventions, 45 MIL. L.
REV. 99 (1969).

1. U.S. Dept. of State, Trial of War Criminals 23, Dept. of State Pub. No. 2420 (1945).
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Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all as defined in the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as defendants in this cause and as indicated on the counts hereinafter set
out: Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter
Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Hulbach,
Karl Donitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schtrach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur Seyn Inquart,
Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath and Hans Fritzsche, individually and as members of any of the Groups or Organizations next
hereinafter named.
II. The following are named as Groups or Organizations (since
dissolved) which should be declared criminal by reason of their
aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof and in
connection with the conviction of such of the named defendants as
were members thereof; Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das
Korps Der Politischen Leiter DerNational-SozialislischenDeutschen
Arbeiterpartei(Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die Schutzstaffeln Der National-Sozialistischen Deutschen Ar-Beitervartei (commonly known as the "SS") and including Die Sicherheitsdienst
(commonly known as the "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizet (Secret
State Police, commonly known as the "Gestapo"); Die
SuIrmabteilungen Die N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the "SA");
and the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces ....
COUNT ONE-THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY

(Charter,

Article 6, Especially 6(a))
All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated as leaders, organizers, instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the
commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and,
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, are individually
responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any
persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy. The common
plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against
Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated and
waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances. In the development
and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to embrace
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the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the
defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against
countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of
war, including as typical and systematic means by which the wars
were prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor
and for other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories, murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on
the high seas, the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of
public and private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns,
and villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity.
The common plan or conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined upon and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within
Germany and within occupied territories, and other inhumane acts
committed against civilian populations before and during the war,
and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, in execution of the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal
wars, many of such acts and persecutions being violations of the
domestic laws of the countries where perpetrated ....
COUNT TWO--CRIMEs AGAINST PEACE

(Charter, Article 6(a))

All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in the planning,
preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which
were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and
assurances . ...
COUNT THREE-WAR CRIMES

(Charter, Article 6,

Especially 6(b))
All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1st September, 1939, and 8th May, 1945 in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1st
September, 1939, and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on
the High Seas.
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated
and executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit War Crimes
as defined in Article 6(b) of the Charter. This plan involved,
among other things, the practice of "total war" including methods
of combat and of military occupation in direct conflict with the
laws and customs of war, and the commission of crimes perpetrated
on the field of battle during encounters with enemy armies, and
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against prisoners of war, and in occupied territories against the civilian population of such territories.
The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and
by other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible
(under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War Crimes performed their acts in execution of a
common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in
the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the
defendants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices.
These methods and crimes constituted violations of international conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized
nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of
conduct ....
COUNT FOUR--CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

(Charter, Article 6,

Especially 6(c))
All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of years preceding 8th May, 1945 in Germany and in
all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed
forces since 1st September, 1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia
and in Italy and on the High Seas.
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated
and executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes
against Humanity as defined in Article 6(c) of the Charter. This
plan involved, among other things, the murder and persecution of
all who were or who were suspected of being opposed to the common plan alleged in Count One.
The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants and by other persons for whose acts the defendants are
responsible, (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons,
when committing the said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War
Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices.
These methods and crimes constituted violations of international conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized
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nations and were involved in and part of a systematic course of
conduct. The said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter.
The prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count
Three as also constituting Crimes against Humanity.2

APPENDIX D
EXCERPTS FROM JUDGMENT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
SEPTEMBER 30, 1946
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression-Opinion and Judgment (1947)
On the 8th August 1945 the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the
United States of America, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entered into an Agreement establishing this Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular
geographical location. In accordance with Article 5, the following
Governments of the United Nations have expressed their adherence to the agreement: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia,
Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand,
India, Venezuela, Uraguay, and Paraguay.
By the Charter annexed to the Agreement, the constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were defined ....
Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tribunal have
been held; 33 witnesses gave evidence orally for the prosecution
against the individual defendants, and 61 witnesses, in addition to
19 of the defendants, gave evidence for the defense.
A further 143 witnesses gave evidence for the defense by
means of written answers to interrogatories.
The Tribunal appointed commissioners to hear evidence relating to the organizations, and 101 witnesses were heard for the de2. The indictment was signed by Robert H. Jackson for the United States, Francois de
Menthon for France, Hartley Shawcross for the United Kingdom, and R.A. Rudenko for the
Soviet Union.
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fense before the commissioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other
witnesses were submitted. Six reports were also submitted, summarizing the contents of a great number of further affidavits.
Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed by 155,000 people,
were submitted on behalf of the Political leaders, 136,213 on behalf
of the SA, 7000 on behalf of the S.D., 7000 on behalf of the General
Staff and OKW, and 200 on behalf of the Gestapo.
The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the organizations.
The documents tendered in evidence for the prosecution of the individual defendants and the organizations numbered several
thousands. A complete stenographic record of everything said in
court has been made, as well as an electrical recording of all the
proceedings.
Copies of all the documents put in evidence by the prosecution
have been supplied to the defense in the German language. The
applications made by the defendants for the production of witnesses and documents raised serious problems in some instances,
on account of the unsettled state of the country. It was also necessary to limit the number of witnesses to be called, in order to have
an expeditious hearing, in accordance with Article 18(c) of the
Charter.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement
and Charter, and the crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set
out in Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding
upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by
the civilized world. The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of
power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the
great importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has
heard full argument from the prosecution and the defense, and will
express its view on the matter.
It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental
principle of all law - international and domestic - is that there
can be no punishment of crime without a preexisting law. Nullum
crimen sine legel,nullapoenasine lege. It was submitted that expost
facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations,
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that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the
time the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had
defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission, and no court had been created to try and punish offenders.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the Maxim nullum
crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a
principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who
in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring
states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far
from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the positions they did
in the government of Germany, the defendants, or at least some of
them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes; they
must have known that they were acting in defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case alone, it
would appear that the maxim has an application to the present
facts.
[It] is argued that the pact does not expressly enact that such
wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such
wars. To the extent the same is true with regard to the laws of
war contained in the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibiting resort to certain methods of waging war. These included the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned
weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and similar matters.
Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long before the
date of the Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been
crimes, punishable as offenses against the laws of war; yet the
Hague Convention nowhere designates such practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a
court to try and punish offenders. For many years past, however,
military tribunals have tried and punished individuals guilty of
violating the rules of land warfare laid down by this Convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war
are doing that which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague Convention.
In interpreting the words of the pact, it must be remembered that
international law is not the product of an international legislature, and that such international agreements as the Pact of Paris
have to deal with general principles of law, and not with administrative matters of procedure. The law of war is to be found not
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1
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gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military
courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows
the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do
no more than express and define for more accurate reference the
principles of law already existing.
The principal objection appeared to be in the difficulty of defining the acts which would constitute "aggression," rather than any
doubt as to the criminality of aggressive war. The preamble to the
League of Nations 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, ("Geneva Protocol"), after "recognizing the solidarity of the members of the international community," declared
that "a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity
and is an international crime." It went on to declare that the contracting parties were "desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system provided in the Covenant of the League of
Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between the states and
of ensuring the repression of international crimes." The Protocol
was recommended to the members of the League of Nations by a
unanimous resolution in the Assembly of the 48 members of the
League. These members included Italy and Japan, but Germany
was not then a member of the League.
Although the Protocol was never ratified, it was signed by the
leading statesmen of the world, representing the vast majority of
the civilized States and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evidence of the intention to brand aggressive war as an international
crime.
[Many] expressions of opinion, [and declarations] solemnly
made, reinforced the construction which the Tribunal placed upon
the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not merely
illegal, but is criminal. The prohibition of aggressive war demanded by the conscience of the world, finds its expression in the
series of Pacts and Treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred.
It is also important to remember that Article 227 of the Treaty
of Versailles provided for the constitution of a special tribunal,
composed of representatives of five of the Allied and Associated
Powers which had been belligerents in the First World War opposed to Germany, to try the former German Emperor "for a
supreme Offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties." The purpose of this trial was expressed to be "to vindicate the solemn obligations of international undertakings, and the
validity of international morality." In Article 228 of the Treaty, the
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German Government expressly recognized the right of the Allied
Powers "to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war."
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the
actions of sovereign states, and provides no punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act in question is an act of State,
those who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That
international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon states has long been recognized.
The principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a State, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declares: "The
official position of defendants, whether as heads of State, or responsible officials in government departments shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating punishment."
On the other hand, the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State. He who
violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing
action moves outside its competence under international law.
It was also submitted on behalf of these defendants that in doing what they did they were acting under the orders of Hitler, and
therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts committed by
them in carrying out these orders. The Charter specifically provides in Article 8: "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to
orders of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment."
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of
all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation
of the international law of war has never been recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here provides,
the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true
test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most
nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice
was in fact possible.
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V.

THE LAW AS TO THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY

In the previous recital of the facts relating to aggressive war, it
is clear that planning and preparation had been carried out in the
most systematic way at every stage of the history.

Planning and preparation are essential to the making of war.
In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a crime under international law. The Charter defines this offense as planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression "or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment . . . of the foregoing." The indictment follows this distinction. Count one charges the common plan or conspiracy. Count
two charges the planning and waging of war. The same evidence
has been introduced to support both counts.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence establishes the

common planning to prepare and wage war by certain of the defendants. It is immaterial to consider whether a single conspiracy
to the extent and over the time set out in the indictment has been
conclusively proved. Continued planning, with aggressive war as

the objective, has been established beyond doubt ....
VI.

WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

The Tribunal proposes, therefore, to deal quite generally with
the question of war crimes, and to refer to them later when examining the responsibility of the individual defendants in relation to
them. Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered,
not only in defiance of the well-established rules of international
law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity. Civilian populations in occupied territories suffered the same
fate. Whole populations were deported to Germany for the purposes of slave labor upon defense works, armament production and
similar tasks connected with the war effort. Hostages were taken in
very large numbers from the civilian populations in all the occupied countries, and were shot as suited the German purposes. Public and private property was systematically plundered and pillaged
in order to enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense of the
rest of Europe. Cities and towns and villages were wantonly destroyed without military justification or necessity. .
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The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity

The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the Definition which it gives both of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
With respect to war crimes, however, as has already been pointed
out, the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were
already recognized as war crimes under international law. They
were covered by Articles 46, 50, 52 and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46 and 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1929. That violation of these provisions constituted crimes
for which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled
to admit of argument.
But it is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in
this case, because of the "general participation" clause in Article 2
of the Hague Convention of 1907. That clause provided: "The provisions contained in the regulations (rules of land warfare) referred
to in Article 1 as well as in the present convention do not apply
except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention." Several of the belligerents in
the recent war were not parties to this convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this
question. The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention
expressly stated that it was an attempt "to revise the general laws
and customs of war," which it thus recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and custom of war which are referred to in Article 6(b) of the Charter.
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt
whatever that political opponents were murdered in Germany
before the war, and that many of them were kept in concentration
camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of
terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases
was organized and systematic. The policy of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939,
who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the same period
is established beyond all doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have
been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that
revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been
satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in conhttps://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1
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nection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make
a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against
humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war of 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale,
which were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all
committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive
war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.
DIsPOSITION AND OUTCOME OF THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
Count I
Common Plan

Count 2
Crime vs.
Peace

Count 3
War
Crimes

Count 4
Crimes vs.
Humanity

Sentence

Goering

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Death I

Hess

Guilty

Guilty

Acquitted

Acquitted

Life
2
imprisonment

Von Ribbentrop

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Gen. Keitel

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Defendant

Kaltenbrunner
Rosenberg

Acquitted
Guilty

Guilty

Frank

Acquitted

Frick

Acquitted

Streicher

Acquitted

Funk

Acquitted

Guilty

Schacht

Acquitted

Acquitted

Life
imprisonment
None 3

Adm. Doenitz

Acquitted

Guilty

Ten
years

Adm. Raeder

Guilty

Guilty

Von Schirach

Acquitted

Sauckel

Acquitted

Acquitted

Guilty

Guilty

Gen. Jodl
Von Papen

Acquitted

Guilty
Acquitted

Seyss-Inquart

Acquitted

Guilty

Speer
Von Neurath

Guilty

Life
imprisonment

Guilty
Guilty

Twenty
years

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Guilty

Guilty

Death
None 4

Guilty

Guilty

Death

Acquitted

Acquitted

Guilty

Guilty

Twenty
years

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Guilty

Fifteen
years

Acquitted
Guilty

Acquitted
Guilty

None 5
Death 6

Fritzsche

Acquitted

Bormann

Acquitted

Gestapo

Criminal, with limitations

SD

Criminal, with limitations

Leadership Corps, Nazi Party
SA

Criminal, with limitations

Reich Cabinet

Not declared criminal
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Not declared criminal

Committed suicide after sentencing and before execution.
Soviet dissent from refusal to impose death sentence.
Soviet dissent.
Soviet dissent.
Soviet dissent.
Tried in abstentia; if he is found, the penalty is subject to reduction by the Control Council.

APPENDIX E
CONVENTION ON THE NONAPPLICABILITY OF
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY'
Article I
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date of their commission:
a. War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of August 8, 1945 and confirmed by Resolutions 3(I) of February 13, 1946, and 95(I) of
December 11, 1946, of the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly the 'grave breaches' enumerated in the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of war victims;
b. Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of
war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of August 8, 1945,
and confirmed by resolutions 3(1) of February 13, 1946 and 95(I) of
December 11, 1946, of the General Assembly of the United Nations, of apartheid,and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were committed.
Article II
If any of the crimes mentioned in article I are committed, the
provisions of this Convention shall apply to representatives of the
state authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission
1. G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 40, U.N. Doc. A/7218
(1968).
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of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives of the state
authority who tolerate their commission.
Article III
The states parties to the present Convention undertake to
adopt all necessary domestic measures, legislative or otherwise,
with a view to making possible the extradition, in accordance with
international law, of the persons referred to in article II of this Convention.
Article IV
The states parties to the present Convention undertake to
adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes,
any legislative or other measures necessary to insure that statutory
or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes referred to in articles I and II of this Convention
and that, where they exist, such limitations shall be abolished.
Article V
This Convention shall, until December 31, 1969, be open for
signature by any state member of the United Nations or member of
any of its specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by any state party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and by any other state which has been invited by
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to
this Convention.
Article VI
This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of
ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
Article VII
This Convention shall be open to accession by any state referred to in article V. Instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article VIII
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the nineteenth
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day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each state ratifying this Convention or acceding to it
after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession,
the Convention shall enter into force on the nineteeth day after the
date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article IX
1. After the expiry of a period of ten years from the date on
which this Convention enters into force, a request for the revision
of the Convention may be made at any time by any contracting
party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide
upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.

APPENDIX F
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ISRAEL V EICHMANNI:
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian
nationality, who was involved in the Nazi murders in Germany and
Austria of large numbers of Jewish persons of German, Polish, and
other nationalities prior to the 1945 defeat of Germany, escaped to
Argentina. There he was tracked down by Israeli nationals (it was
doubtful whether officials or private persons), seized, and abducted
to Israel. Argentina, while disclaiming any condonation of the
crimes of which Eichmann was accused, complained to the Security
Council, which declared that "acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore
cause international friction, may, if repeated, endanger international peace and security, [and requested the Government of Israel]
to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the rules of international law." 2 Argentina
1. 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
2. See Letter from the Representative of Argentina addressed to the President of the
Security Council, dated June 10, 1960, U.N. Doc. S/4334, at 24 (1960). For the text of the
Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic Addressed to the Em-

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1

92

International Law Journal: Table of Contents
EICHMANN TRIAL

did not, however, demand the return of Eichmann, and by a joint
communique issued August 3, 1960 by the Argentine and Israeli
governments, they resolved "to regard as closed the incident which
arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel which infringed
the fundamental rights of the State of Argentina." 3
Eichmann was tried in Israel under Israel's Nazi Collaborators
(punishment) Law, enacted after Israel became a state in 1948, convicted, and executed after the judgment was confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Israel on appeal in 1962. The Court found that
national law would prevail over international law in an Israeli
court, but examined the international law question at length.
EXCERPTS FROM THE OPINION
11. From the point of view of International law, the power of
the State of Israel to enact the law in question or Israel's "right to
punish" is based, with respect to the offenses in question, on a dual
foundation: the universal character of the crimes in question and
their specific character as intended to exterminate the Jewish people. . .
.
12. The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are not crimes
under Israel alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of
mankind and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offenses
against the law of nations itself (delictajuris gentium). Therefore,
so far from international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of
countries with respect to such crimes, international law is, in the
absence of an International Court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of every country to give effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try
crimes under international law is universal ....
[Here the court discussed piracy and instances of universality
jurisdiction over war crimes. It also referred to genocide as having
become a crime under international law prior to the Genocide Convention. The court held that the limitation in the Genocide Convention, article 6, to trial before the court of the territory was a
bassy of Israel on June 8, 1960, see U.N. Doc. S/4336, at 35 (1960). For the Israeli reply, see
U.N. Doc. S/4342 (1960). The Security Council's Resolution appears in 15 U.N. SCOR
(868th mtg.) 24, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
3. Reprinted in Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 59 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
4. See id. at 24-26.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id.
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treaty rule only, applicable only to offenses committed after the Genocide Convention entered into force in 1951.]
26. It is superfluous to add that the "crime against the Jewish
people," which constitutes the crime of "genocide," is nothing but
the gravest type of "crime against humanity" (and all the more so
because both under Israeli law and under the Convention a special
intention is requisite for its commission, an intention that is not
required for the commission of a "crime against humanity").
Therefore, all that has been said in the Nuremberg principles about
"crimes against humanity" applies afortiori to "crimes against the
Jewish people . . ..
27. It is indeed difficult to find a more convincing instance of
a just retroactive law than the legislation providing for the punishment of war criminals and [perpetrators of crimes] against humanity and against the Jewish people, and all the reasons justifying the
Nuremberg Judgments justify eo ipse the retroactive legislation of
the Israel legislator . . . .The accused in this case is charged with
the implementation of the plan for the "final solution of the problem of the Jews." Can anyone in his right mind doubt the absolute
criminality of such acts... ?I
28. The contention of learned counsel for the defense that it
is not the accused but the State on whose behalf he had acted who
is responsible for his criminal acts is only true as to its second part.
It is true that under international law Germany bears not only
moral, but also legal, responsibility for all the crimes that were
committed as its own "acts of State," including the crimes attributed to the accused. But that responsibility does not detract one
iota from the personal responsibility of the accused for his acts
9

The repudiation of the argument of "act of State" is one of the
principles of international law that were acknowledged by the
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and were unanimously affirmed by the United Nations Assembly in its Resolution
of December 11, 1946 . . .
30.
7.
8.
9.
10.

We have discussed at length the international character

Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

41.
42.
47.
47-48.
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of the crimes in question because this offers the broadest possible,
though not the only, basis for Israel's jurisdiction according to the
law of nations . . .
41. It is an established rule of law that a person being tried
for an offense against the laws of a State may not oppose his trial by
reason of the illegality of his arrest or of the means whereby he was
brought within the jurisdiction of that State. The courts in England, the United States and Israel have constantly held that the circumstances of the arrest and the mode of bringing the accused into
the territory of the State have no relevance to his trial, and they
have consistently refused in all instances to enter upon an examination of these circumstances ....
50. Indeed, there is no escaping the conclusion that the question of the violation of international law by the manner in which
the accused was brought into the territory of a country arises at the
international level, namely, the relations between the two countries
concerned alone, and must find its solution at such level. .... 3
52. According to the existing rule of law there is no immunity
for a fugitive offender save in the one and only case where he has
been extradited by the asylum State to the requesting State for a
specific offence, which is not the offence for which he was being
tried. The accused was not surrendered to Israel by Argentina, and
the State of Israel is not bound by any agreement with Argentina to
try the accused for any other specific offence . . . and the accused
cannot compel a foreign sovereign State to give him protection
against its will. The accused was a wanted war criminal when he
escaped to Argentina by concealing his true identity. Only after he
was kidnapped and brought to Israel was his identity revealed. After negotiations between the two Governments, the Government of
Argentina waived its demand for his return and declared that it
viewed the incident as closed. The Government of Argentina
thereby refused conclusively to grant the accused any sort of protection. The accused has been brought to trial before the Court of a
State which charges him with grave offences against its laws. The
accused has no immunity against this trial and must stand trial in
I1. Id. at 49.
12. Id. at 59.
13. Id.at 70.
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accordance with the indictment.' 4

APPENDIX G
TEXT OF THE DRAFT CODE OF OFFENSES AGAINST
THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND'
Article 1
Offenses against the peace and security of mankind, as defined
in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals shall be punished.
Article 2
The following acts are offenses against the peace and security
of mankind:
1) Any act of aggression, including the employment by the authorities of a State of armed forces against another State for
any purpose other than national or collective self-defense
or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations.
2) Any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an act of
aggression against another State.
3) The preparation by the authorities of a State of the employment of armed force against another State for any purpose
other than national or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations.
4) The organization, or the encouragement of the organization by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its
territory for incursions into the territory of another State,
or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its
own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed
bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of
departure for incursions into the territory of another State,
as well as direct participation in or support of such incursions.
5) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
14. Id. at 76.
1. 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
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6)

7)

8)

9)

10)

11)
12)

CODE OF OFFENSES

State of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another
State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to foment civil strife in another
State.
The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration
by the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.
Acts by the authorities of a State or violations of its obligations under a treaty which is designed to ensure international peace and security by means of restrictions or
limitations on armaments, or on military training, or on
fortifications, or of other restrictions of the same character.
The annexation by the authorities of a State of territory belonging to another State, by means of acts contrary to international law.
The intervention by the authorities of a State in the internal
or external affairs of another State, by means of coercive
measures of an economic or political character in order to
force its will and thereby obtain advantages of any kind.
Acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such, including:
(i) Killing members of the group;
(ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(iv) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(v) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group;
(vi) Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed
against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities
of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.
Acts in violation of the laws or customs of war.
Acts which constitute:
(i) Conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined in
the preceding paragraphs of this article, or
(ii) Direct incitement to commit any of the offenses
defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article; or
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Complicity in the commission of any of the offenses
defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article; or

(iv) Attempts to commit any of the offenses defined in the
preceding paragraphs of this article.
Article 3
The fact that a person acted as Head of State, as a responsible
governmental official does not relieve him of responsibility for
committing any of the offenses defined in this code.
Article 4
The fact that a person charged with an offense defined in this
code acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior
does not relieve him of responsibility in international law if, in the
circumstances at the time, it was possible for him not to comply
with that order.
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